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Right Theory, Wrong Reasons: 
Dynamic Interpretation, the Charter 
and “Fundamental Laws” 
Randal N.M. Graham∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 7 of the Charter is one of those rare and wonderful texts that 
inspire judges to discuss interpretive theory. This should come as no 
surprise. The language of section 7 is so vague and open-textured that it 
provides little guidance to those who interpret and apply it. Indeed, the 
text of section 7 includes phrases and concepts that are “as enigmatic 
and amorphous as any in our jurisprudence”.1 Does section 7’s reference 
to “liberty” encompass freedom of contract? What are the boundaries of 
“fundamental justice”? What is the meaning of “life”? The nebulous 
language of section 7 provides no answers to these questions, yet judges 
are compelled to grapple with questions of this nature whenever Charter 
litigants rest their claims on section 7’s text. 
Because of their vague and amorphous nature, the words of section 
7 lack the clarity or precision necessary to constrain the outcomes of 
judicial decisions. As a result, judges asked to interpret section 7 are 
forced to contend with fundamental questions of adjudicative theory. 
Judges applying section 7 must consider how much discretion 
interpreters have when interpreting vague constitutional text, and reflect 
on the extent to which the lawgiver’s intention can impose constraints 
on the meaning given to legislative language. More fundamentally, 
judges interpreting section 7 must ask themselves what it truly means to 
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“interpret” legislation — is legal interpretation a dynamic, creative 
endeavour in which judges are active participants in the generation of 
meaning, or is it simply the application of the predetermined 
expectations of the democratically accountable author of the statute’s 
text? What are the respective powers of interpreter and author? These 
questions are particularly important in the context of section 7 of the 
Charter: not only is the section so open-ended that the answers to these 
questions will govern the section’s application, but — because of the 
constitutional force of section 7 — a court’s answers to these questions 
carry important implications for fundamental human rights, for the 
limits of legislative power and for the division of powers between the 
government and the courts. In the context of section 7, the court’s 
adoption of a particular theory of interpretation carries far-reaching 
implications for the political institutions that shape our nation and our 
rights.   
The purpose of this essay is to examine the interpretive theory 
typically espoused by courts interpreting section 7. That theory, known 
as “dynamic” or “progressive” interpretation,2 posits that courts should 
play an extremely active role in the development of legislative meaning, 
and that a court’s interpretation of legislation (including section 7 of the 
Charter) is not constrained by the expectations of the legislative author. 
As we shall see, my view is that dynamic interpretation is — in most 
cases, at least — the proper method of interpreting the Charter. 
Unfortunately, Canadian courts have generally misunderstood the 
rationale for invoking dynamic interpretation, and this misunderstanding 
carries important implications for the interpretation of legislative texts. 
Because of the courts’ misapprehension of the reasons for using 
dynamic interpretation, courts may use dynamic interpretation where its 
use is inappropriate, or fail to use dynamic interpretation where it is the 
optimal method of construing legislation. In the hope of avoiding 
problems of this nature, this essay proposes an alternative rationale for 
the invocation of dynamic interpretation. Unlike the rationale that has 
typically been put forward by our courts, the rationale I proffer in this 
essay corresponds to the actual interpretive practices of Canadian jurists. 
More importantly, it provides a more principled method of determining 
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when dynamic interpretation is the appropriate method of resolving 
specific interpretive problems.   
While section 7 of the Charter could be regarded as Canada’s 
“poster child” for dynamic interpretation, the dynamic approach to 
interpreting legislation has much broader application. The essay 
accordingly begins with an overview of dynamic interpretation and its 
application beyond the realm of constitutional law. Following that 
overview, the paper describes (in section II) the benefits and weaknesses 
of dynamic interpretation. Section III of the paper then turns to the 
interpretation of section 7 itself, using section 7 jurisprudence to 
demonstrate the courts’ traditional rationale for selecting dynamism as 
the “official method” of interpreting constitutional text. The essay goes 
on (in section IV) to reject the court’s traditional rationale, and 
concludes (in sections V and VI) by proposing an alternative “meta-
theory” of statutory interpretation — one that provides a principled 
method of determining when dynamic interpretation is appropriate, and 
when alternative theories of statutory construction are better able to 
guide the courts in their interpretation of legislative language. 
II. DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION 
1. Overview 
Dynamic interpretation (or “dynamism”) is the opposite of originalist 
construction. Where originalists see the framers’ historic intention as the 
only legitimate guide to interpretation, proponents of dynamism hold 
that laws should be interpreted by reference to contemporary ideals, 
with little or no attention paid to the legislator’s intent. Where the 
originalist believes that the lawgiver’s expectations govern the meaning 
of all statutory texts, the dynamist holds that a statute’s meaning “is not 
tied to the framer’s original understanding but is permitted to evolve in 
response to both linguistic and social change”.3  
While originalists are frequently portrayed as “statutory archaeologists” 
who search for historical evidence of an Act’s intended meaning,4 
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proponents of dynamic interpretation refuse to see a statute’s meaning as an 
artifact to be discovered through the use of historical evidence. Instead, the 
dynamic interpreter sees the statute’s text as clay that can be shaped in ways 
that were not intended by the statute’s drafters. Where the requirements of 
logic or justice suggest that a statute should be interpreted in a way that 
differs from the intention of the statute’s author, dynamic interpretation 
permits the interpreter to select a construction that fits with current needs 
and departs from historical expectations. This “dynamic vision” of statutory 
construction is encapsulated by Francis Bennion’s nautical analogy: 
[T]he ongoing Act resembles a vessel launched on some one-way 
voyage from the old world to the new. The vessel is not going to 
return; nor are its passengers. Having only what they set out with, they 
cope as best they can. On arrival in the present, they deploy their 
native endowments under conditions originally unguessed at.5 
According to this view of legislation, the meaning of statutory 
language must adapt in response to changing social conditions. As time 
passes and the text is applied to unforeseen situations, the statute’s 
meaning evolves to become something more than what the drafters 
intended. Indeed, in many instances, the statute may evolve in ways that 
go against the initial intention of the statute’s author. 
In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,6 William Eskridge provides 
examples of the manner in which dynamic interpretation can cause a 
statute to grow in ways that conflict with the expectations of the 
statute’s author. The most striking example Eskridge offers involves the 
evolution of section 212(a)(4) of the American Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952 (the “INA”). Section 212(a)(4) of the INA 
required the exclusion of certain “aliens” from the United States of 
America. Included in the prohibited list were aliens “afflicted with 
psychopathic personality, or sexual deviation, or a mental defect”. At 
the time of the section’s enactment in 1952, the purpose behind the 
provision was clear: the drafters had stated that their purpose in using 
this statutory language was to prevent homosexual immigrants from 
entering the U.S. Indeed, Eskridge notes that the phrase “sexual 
deviation” had been added to the statute in response to a case that 
decided that “psychopathic personality” was insufficiently precise to be 
applied to homosexuals. On the advice of the Public Health Service 
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(“PHS”), the legislative drafters had decided that homosexuality was a 
form of “mental disease” or “sexual deviation” that would be caught by 
the language used in section 212(a)(4). 
An originalist construction of section 212(a)(4) would have referred 
to legislative intent and made it clear that homosexuality was a “sexual 
deviation” for the purposes of the Act. Notwithstanding this 
discriminatory intention, however, by the end of the 1970s even the 
PHS (which was responsible for enforcing the INA) had reinterpreted 
section 212(a)(4) and announced that the PHS lacked the authority “to 
exclude gay men, bisexuals, and lesbians pursuant to section 
212(a)(4)”.7 What happened between the date of the statute’s enactment 
and the PHS’s “reinterpretation” of section 212(a)(4)? The text of the 
relevant statute remained constant, but its meaning changed radically. 
According to William Eskridge, this reinterpretation is an instance of 
dynamic interpretation. Within a decade of the enactment of section 
212(a)(4), American courts began to interpret the section in ways that 
made it difficult to apply the statute’s language to homosexuals.8 The 
reasoning of the courts that reinterpreted (and improved) section 
212(a)(4) is best understood by reference to the changes that took place 
in society’s views concerning homosexuality during the 1960s and 70s. 
According to Eskridge: 
Congress’s .... targeting of “homosexuals” under one of the medical 
exclusions rested on the belief, widely held in the 1950s, that 
“homosexuals” are mentally ill. This view became more controversial 
by the 1960s, as empirical studies found no correlation between 
pathology and homosexuality .... Although the view of homosexuality 
as a disease was still widely held in the medical community 
throughout the 1960s, everything changed — almost immediately — 
after the Stonewall riots in 1969, which triggered gay activism against 
traditional penalties based on sexual orientation. After Stonewall, it 
was much harder to dismiss lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals as 
psychotics, for they not only were showing their faces and talking 
back, but were working within the medical profession to discredit the 
earlier views.9 
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Eskridge goes on to point out that after the Stonewall riots,10 
American medical associations removed homosexuality from the list of 
mental disorders. The language of the INA, by contrast, remained static 
throughout this period. Only through the use of dynamic interpretation 
were courts able to disregard the legislature’s original intention and 
permit homosexual immigrants to cross America’s borders. As a result 
of drastic changes in government policy and shifts in public opinion, 
even members of Congress eventually admitted that, despite the fact that 
the actual text of the INA had not been changed, the language used in 
section 212(a)(4) no longer meant what had initially been intended.11 As 
a result, the American courts and Congress used dynamic interpretation 
to allow the statute’s language to keep pace with current ideals. 
Canadian courts have enthusiastically adopted dynamic interpretation 
as the “official method” of interpreting Canada’s constitutional texts. 
When interpreting section 7 of the Charter in particular, Canadian jurists 
have consistently held that constitutional language is best construed 
through the invocation of dynamic interpretation. Before reviewing the 
history of dynamic interpretation in the context of the Charter (and in 
the context of section 7 in particular), it is important to assess the costs 
and benefits associated with a dynamic approach to statutory 
construction. Section II, 2. of this essay accordingly provides a brief 
discussion of the benefits that are typically associated with dynamic 
construction, while section II, 3. describes the criticisms that are most 
frequently levelled against it.  
2. The Benefits of Dynamic Interpretation 
Whether one applies it in the realm of constitutional law or in the 
interpretation of “ordinary” enactments, dynamic interpretation can be 
quite useful. The principal benefit of dynamic interpretation is its ability 
to overcome originalism’s flaws. Where originalism fails to respond to 
linguistic evolution, dynamic interpretation thrives on it. Where 
originalism fails to recognize the interplay between the interpretation of 
a law and its application, dynamic interpretation embraces this interplay 
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as the ultimate source of statutory meaning. While originalism relies on 
the fictitious and untraceable notion of legislative intent, “dynamic 
judges” rely on something that exists: the courts’ assessment of 
society’s current needs.12 
Dynamism’s “evolutionary” portrayal of statutory interpretation 
provides a far more accurate model of judicial interpretation than the 
description that is provided by originalists. According to Eskridge, the 
originalists are wrong in their contention that the meaning of a statute is 
an historical artifact that remains static over time. On the contrary, 
statutory meaning constantly changes, even where the text of the statute 
remains constant. As Eskridge correctly notes, the evolution of statutory 
meaning through the application of law to fact is inevitable. Laws 
inexorably bend and stretch in ways in which their authors could not 
have predicted. The direction in which the law “bends” is inescapably 
influenced by the views of the interpreter, views that will be coloured 
more by the current legal context than by any historical beliefs held by 
the legislative body that was responsible for the legislation’s enactment. 
This inescapable process is described by Sullivan and Driedger as the 
means by which “the courts can make the adjustments required for a 
comfortable fit between the current needs of subjects and the original 
law”.13 
Like Eskridge, Côté contends that dynamic interpretation does a 
better job than originalism of “dealing with the dynamic relationship 
between drafter and interpreter”.14 According to Côté, the drafters of 
statutory language do not establish the legislation’s meaning, as 
meaning is always “born of interpretation”.15 Over time, as the law is 
applied to more and more unforeseen situations, the statute’s meaning 
evolves into something beyond that which was envisioned by the 
legislative author. Francis Bennion describes the forces behind this 
evolutionary process as follows: 
Each generation lives under the law it inherits. Constant formal 
updating is not practicable, so an Act takes on a life of its own. What 
the original framers intended sinks gradually into history. While their 
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language may endure as law, its current subjects are likely to find that 
law more and more ill-fitting.16 
The dynamic interpreter of language, unlike the originalist, plays an 
active role in the development of meaning. While the originalist plays 
an essentially passive role in unearthing historical intention, the 
dynamic interpreter enters a partnership with the statute’s original 
drafters, assisting in the creation of meaning through the application of 
abstract language to concrete fact. 
Leaving aside any normative implications of the interpreter’s role in 
creating a statute’s meaning, one cannot help but acknowledge that this 
“dynamic” description of judicial interpretation is far more accurate than 
originalism’s depiction of the interpretive process. An interpreter of 
language cannot help but be influenced by the context in which an 
interpretive problem arises. As Côté notes: 
Legal interpretation goes beyond the mere quest for historical truth. 
The judge, in particular, does not interpret a statute solely for the 
intellectual pleasure of reviving the thoughts that prevailed at the time 
the enactment was drafted. He interprets it with an eye to action: the 
application of the statute. Legal interpretation is thus often an 
“interpretive operation”, that is, one linked to the resolution of 
concrete issues. Most authors recognize that the application of statutes 
returns to influence their interpretation.17 
The facts that surround an interpretive problem will inevitably 
colour the judge’s view of the meaning of a legislative passage. Context 
is impossible to ignore. For this reason, Côté argues that any form of 
interpretation that ignores the significant role of factual context is both 
“difficult” and “dangerous”,18 and paints a bleak and inaccurate picture 
of the practice of judicial interpretation. Originalism is simply wrong in 
its contention that interpretive problems can be resolved by reference to 
predetermined meanings: interpretive problems that arise as time goes 
by are not resolved by statutory language — on the contrary, the 
resolution of these problems typically leads to marginal changes to the 
meaning of the statutory text. This evolution of the meaning of 
legislation is inevitable. As a result, dynamism’s account of 
interpretation is far more accurate than the originalist description. 
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Beyond its obvious descriptive power, dynamism has demonstrated 
the power to promote justice in difficult cases. Because dynamism 
explicitly recognizes the “evolutive” nature of language, dynamic 
interpretation can permit an archaic law to evolve and respond to 
society’s current vision of justice. This is particularly evident in the 
realm of human rights, where the public’s views of what qualifies as 
“justice” or as a “basic human right” often evolve at a pace that outstrips 
the speed with which a legislature can amend its statutes. According to 
William Eskridge, dynamic interpretation permits the court to respond 
to current views of justice and evolving notions of basic human rights 
by using old or out-dated statutes in creative and unexpected ways. As 
an example Eskridge points to the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
United Steel Workers v. Weber.19 
In Weber, the United States Supreme Court was called upon to 
interpret section 703(a)(1) of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibited employment-related discrimination on the grounds of 
“race, color, religion, sex or national origin”. The problem before the 
Court in Weber involved the legality of private affirmative action 
programs. Under a collective agreement entered into by Kaiser Aluminum 
and the United Steelworkers, Kaiser Aluminum had established a training 
plan designed to eliminate racial imbalances in the workforce. The 
collective agreement required 50 per cent of the places in the program to 
be reserved for African Americans, who would be selected to fill 
positions in the Kaiser Aluminum Plant. One of the side effects of the 
program at issue in Weber was the rejection of certain highly qualified 
white workers in favour of less experienced black employees. One of the 
white labourers who was passed over due to the program was Brian 
Weber, who filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) pursuant to section 703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights 
Act. According to Weber, the literal terms of the Civil Rights Act 
prohibited affirmative action programs on the grounds that such programs 
amounted to employment-related discrimination based on “race” and 
“colour”. Indeed, Weber presented substantial evidence to the effect that 
the original intention of the drafters of the statute had been to prevent 
affirmative action programs from being created. Among the evidence 
presented by Weber was an interpretive memorandum submitted to the 
Senate by the drafters of the relevant provision. According to this 
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memorandum, section 703(a)(1) would ensure that employers would not 
be permitted “to prefer Negroes for future vacancies”.20 In essence, the 
memorandum established that the purpose of section 703(a)(1) was to 
require “colour-blind” hiring, whereby employment vacancies would be 
filled by reference to objective, job-related criteria without reference to 
race or colour. Clearly, the original intention of the drafters of section 
703(a)(1) was to prohibit the kind of program at issue in Weber. As a 
result, the use of originalist construction would have required the Court to 
rule in Weber’s favour. 
Surprisingly, the Court abandoned its traditional originalist position 
and ruled that Kaiser’s affirmative action program was permissible 
under the statute. According to Brennan J. for the majority, the program 
at issue in Weber, while not in line with the framers’ expectations, 
advanced the overall goals and “spirit” of the statute. As a result, despite 
the apparent intention of the drafters, who had firmly believed that 
affirmative action would be prohibited by the statute, the Court in 
Weber decided that a “dynamic” interpretation of the Act did more to 
achieve the legislation’s objectives.21 
According to William Eskridge, the Court’s decision in Weber 
demonstrates the utility of dynamic interpretation. Clearly, one purpose 
of the statute at issue in Weber had been to eliminate racial imbalances 
in the workforce. Unfortunately, the “colour-blind” approach envisioned 
by Congress was unsuccessful: in 1974, 10 years after the statute was 
passed, only 1.83 per cent of the workers in Kaiser’s plant were African 
American, despite the fact that persons of African descent made up 39 
per cent of the area’s workforce. The epidemic of racial inequality that 
had given rise to the need for section 703(a)(1) had not been cured 
despite the efforts of the legislation’s creators. Eskridge notes that the 
problem arose because of objective hiring practices: Kaiser traditionally 
hired only experienced craft-workers. Because of their past exclusion 
from the workforce, black workers were simply unqualified for the jobs 
at Kaiser’s Plant. In order to remedy this problem, Kaiser Aluminum 
                                                                                                            
20 110 Congressional Record 7213, Clark-Case memorandum. 
21 Note that Weber might initially seem like an instance of purposive interpretation (a 
specific form of originalism discussed in Graham, supra, note ∗, c. 1). Weber cannot, however, 
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and the United Steelworkers Union had created the plan at issue in 
Weber and thereby improved the racial balance in the workforce. Under 
an originalist approach to interpretation, Kaiser’s proactive attack on 
discrimination would have failed, and the overall objective of the statute 
at issue in Weber (i.e., the promotion of racial balance) would not have 
been reached. Only the Court’s surprising adoption of a dynamic 
interpretation of the anti-discrimination law permitted the law to achieve 
its purpose of promoting equality in the workplace. 
Dissenting in Weber, Rehnquist J. invoked an originalist construction 
and noted that the drafters of section 703(a)(1) would not have supported 
a law that permitted employers to engage in affirmative action. Clearly, 
this originalist approach respected the framers’ expectations. What it 
failed to do, however, was to advance the important goal of racial 
equality: a strictly “colour blind” approach to hiring, while in line with the 
drafters’ intentions, would have perpetuated the unjust inequalities that 
existed in the workforce. Unskilled black workers would have been 
ineligible for higher paying positions because of a lack of experience that 
had been caused by generations of discriminatory hiring. Section 
703(a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act, while designed to eliminate employment-
related discrimination, was simply inadequate for this purpose. Only 
through the device of dynamic interpretation could the statute be re-
shaped in a way that permitted it to achieve its ultimate goal. By allowing 
the courts to inject an up-to-date view of social policy into the outdated 
(and often inadequate) language of statutory provisions, dynamic 
interpretation permits courts to achieve just and fair results22 where 
originalist construction is inadequate for this task. 
3. Problems with Dynamic Interpretation 
Despite the many advantages of dynamic interpretation, proponents of 
originalism have found no shortage of flaws in dynamic construction. 
The easiest way to demonstrate these flaws is to turn the typical 
justifications for originalist construction23 on their head: originalism is 
                                                                                                            
22 Of course, white workers (such as Mr. Weber) who were passed over for employment as 
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23 For a full review of the benefits and weaknesses of originalism, see Graham, supra, 
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said to promote certainty in the law, whereas dynamism is inherently 
unpredictable. While originalism is said to provide an “objective” check 
on judicial power, dynamic construction’s highly subjective nature can 
give judges an almost unfettered discretion to interpret laws in 
surprising and whimsical ways. 
One of the most obvious flaws with dynamic interpretation is its 
unpredictable nature. The lack of any objective signpost (such as 
legislative intent) pointing the way to a statute’s meaning makes it 
difficult to foresee the manner in which a provision will be construed. 
Even statutes that have already been subjected to judicial interpretation 
may be “re-interpreted” in unpredictable ways. The reliability of 
precedents is seriously diminished when a future “dynamic interpreter” 
may claim that social ideals have changed in a way that supports a new 
and creative construction of legislative language. While a statutory 
provision may remain unamended for generations, the judicial 
interpretation of that provision may go through several changes. 
Consider the Court’s decision in Weber (discussed above). In that 
case, the Court decided that, despite the intention of the drafters who 
were responsible for its enactment, the anti-discrimination provision of 
the Civil Rights Act did not prohibit affirmative action programs. In 
reliance on the Court’s decision in Weber, employers may have felt free 
to create affirmative action programs in order to foster a more 
egalitarian workplace. But what would happen if the Civil Rights Act 
continued to be subjected to dynamic interpretation? Imagine what 
would occur if the political culture of the nation underwent a shift to the 
right (a scenario that is easy to imagine given current political trends): if 
the courts were to take the view that “modern social ideals” were 
incompatible with “reverse discrimination”, employers who had created 
affirmative action plans might find themselves subjected to legal 
censure. The courts’ continued use of dynamic construction could 
sacrifice consistency on the altar of changing ideals, making it 
dangerous for the members of the public to order their affairs in reliance 
on past judicial decisions. According to dynamism’s critics, such 
problems can be avoided by reliance on historical (and therefore static) 
legislative intention as the touchstone for judicial interpretation. 
The ability of the courts to interpret statutes in unpredictable ways 
points to an even greater problem with dynamic interpretation. Through 
dynamic construction, the courts take on a legislative role, deciding not 
what the legislator meant when enacting a law, but what the legislator 
should have said. According to Earl Crawford: 
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If the courts were permitted to ignore the expressed intent of the 
legislature, they would invade the province of the legislature ... The 
legislature would become a nonentity. Legislative power would in fact 
be wielded by the judiciary. The courts would actually make the 
laws.24 
The vision of a judiciary with limitless legislative power does not sit 
well with dynamism’s critics. According to Sullivan and Driedger, this 
criticism of dynamic construction is rooted in “the idea that in a 
democracy certain kinds of decisions should be taken by an elected 
legislature rather than the courts”.25 Simply put, a non-elected judiciary 
has no right to make decisions that are the province of a politically 
accountable legislative body. 
The indeterminate nature of dynamic interpretation is the source of 
the critics’ fears that dynamic construction will tread on the legislature’s 
power. While it may sound theoretically feasible to allow an Act to 
evolve in response to changing social conditions, in practice this gives 
rise to a host of problems. Who decides when social conditions have 
changed to such a degree that the “judicial amendment” of legislation is 
required? Who defines the prevailing “social and legal context” that 
directs the evolution of legislation? Who should decide the degree to 
which a provision must evolve to respond to the requirements of justice 
or changing ideals? These decisions fall to the courts, with no fixed, 
external frame of reference (such as legislative intent) to act as a means 
of reining in judicial power. Courts will be charged with the task of 
determining whether or not existing statutes meet the needs of modern 
society, and will tailor those statutes in accordance with their own 
subjectively determined views of justice. According to proponents of 
dynamic interpretation, no check on this form of judicial power is 
needed: if the drafters of legislation are unhappy with the court’s 
construction of an enactment, the legislature is free to amend the statute. 
Unfortunately, this is not always feasible. Eskridge acknowledges that 
legislative bodies are largely unaware of judicial interpretation, and only 
respond to judicial construction where highly political problems are 
involved. Unless an election is on the line, the legislature may lack the 
political will to “correct” a creative judicial construction of legislation. 
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Sullivan and Driedger echo this point, noting that “legislatures cannot 
engage in continuous monitoring and adaptation of legislation”.26 Where 
the judiciary’s view of “social needs” or “modern ideals” is 
incompatible with that of the elected branch of the government, the 
legislature lacks the ability (or at least the political will) to counter 
judicial amendments to legislation. 
Owing (in part) to the many weaknesses of dynamic interpretation, 
Canadian courts have refrained from endorsing dynamic interpretation 
as the courts’ “official theory” for interpreting legislation. Instead, our 
courts have adopted originalism as the standard method of interpreting 
most laws. Their preference for originalist construction has been 
justified numerous times in diverse places. In most instances this 
preference has been justified on the basis that only Parliament or the 
legislature has the constitutional power to breathe meaning into the text 
of legislation. Each statute is an expression of sovereign legislative will, 
and it is not the place of the courts to usurp the legislator’s power 
through a “creative” form of judicial interpretation. According to Côté: 
This doctrine finds its principal foundation in other doctrines, namely 
Parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers. The judge, 
who is the ultimate interpreter of laws, is not cloaked in the legitimacy 
of democratic election. Consequently, he must confine himself to 
being, in the words of Montesquieu, “the mouthpiece for the words of 
the law”. It is Parliament, or whomever has been delegated legislative 
power by Parliament, which bears the responsibility for the political 
choices of legislative activity ... These principles postulate the 
predetermination of the meaning by Parliament, the passivity of the 
interpreter on the political level, and the latter’s submission to the 
sovereign will expressed in the enactment.27 
Similarly, Dickerson notes that in a constitutional democracy: 
... the legislature calls the main policy turns and the courts must 
respect its pronouncements. In such a relationship, it would seem clear 
that so far as the legislature has expressed itself by statute the courts 
should try to determine as accurately as possible what the legislature 
intended to be done.28 
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Out of deference to this separation of powers, Canadian courts have 
repeatedly held that originalist construction is the “official theory” of 
statutory interpretation in Canada — the theory of choice for the 
interpretation of “ordinary” laws.29 Dynamic interpretation has no role in 
the interpretation of ordinary enactments, it is argued, because it is not 
the court’s place to change the meaning of laws created through the 
democratic process. 
Despite our courts’ repeated rejection of dynamic interpretation as a 
method of interpreting “ordinary” legislation, our courts have (for quite 
some time) been perfectly happy to depart from their originalist leanings 
and embrace dynamic construction for the purpose of construing the text 
of Canada’s Constitution. As a result, the courts’ choice between 
originalism (on the one hand) and dynamic interpretation (on the other) 
has traditionally depended upon the nature of the statute being 
interpreted: where the statute being interpreted is a constitutional 
document (such as the Charter or the Constitution Act, 1867) the courts 
will use dynamic interpretation.30 Where the statute being interpreted is 
an “ordinary” statute, the court will use originalist construction, 
interpreting the statute by reference to the historical will of the statute’s 
author. The courts’ use of dynamic interpretation in the context of the 
Canadian Constitution — and specifically in the context of section 7 of 
the Charter — is discussed in the next section of this essay. 
III. DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
1. Overview 
While Anglo-Canadian jurists sometimes use dynamic construction 
when resolving difficult cases, our courts rarely acknowledge the use of 
dynamic interpretation in the interpretation of “ordinary” statutes. 
Where they have been willing to openly adopt a dynamic approach to 
interpretation, however, is where the language of the Canadian 
Constitution requires judicial interpretation. In cases involving 
constitutional language, the courts abandon their traditional originalist 
stance in favour of a more dynamic approach to interpretation. The use 
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of dynamic interpretation when construing the Constitution is 
commonly known as the “living tree” approach, and has become the 
official method of constitutional interpretation.  
The “living tree” method of construing the Constitution was 
established by the Privy Council in Edwards v. Canada (Attorney 
General).31 In that case, the Privy Council was asked to interpret section 
24 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which provides (in part) as follows: 
The Governor General shall from Time to Time, in the Queen’s Name, 
by Instrument under the Great Seal of Canada, summon qualified 
Persons to the Senate; and, subject to the Provisions of this Act, every 
Person so summoned shall become a Member of the Senate and a 
Senator. 
The question in Edwards was whether or not the phrase “qualified 
Persons” in section 24 included female persons, permitting women (as 
well as men) to occupy places in the Senate. 
Despite historical evidence that the framers of section 24 had not 
envisioned women in the Senate, the Privy Council in Edwards 
determined that the section’s reference to “qualified Persons” should not 
be construed in accordance with the framers’ expectations. Instead, the 
Constitution’s provisions must be permitted to evolve in response to 
changing ideals and shifting social conditions. In Lord Sankey’s 
opinion: 
The British North America Act planted in Canada a living tree capable 
of growth and expansion within its natural limits. The object of the 
Act was to grant a Constitution to Canada. “Like all written 
constitutions it has been subject to development through usage and 
convention”: Canadian Constitutional Studies, Sir Robert Borden 
(1922). Their Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board 
- it is certainly not their desire - to cut down the provisions of the Act 
by a narrow and technical construction, but rather to give it a large and 
liberal interpretation. …32 
As a result, the “living tree” approach to interpretation was adopted by 
the Privy Council as the principal doctrine of constitutional 
construction. 
                                                                                                            
31 [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C.). 
32 Id., at 136. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Right Theory, Wrong Reasons 185 
The “living tree” approach to interpreting constitutional language 
has been embraced by Canada’s courts. For example, in the Provincial 
Electoral Boundaries case,33 the Supreme Court of Canada held that “the 
Charter is engrafted onto the living tree that is the Canadian 
Constitution”, and that the Canadian Constitution “must be capable of 
growth to meet the future”.34 Similarly, the Court in Hunter v. Southam 
Inc.35 declared that as a “living tree”, the Constitution of Canada “must 
… be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, 
political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers”.36 As a 
result of these and numerous other decisions, it would appear that where 
the construction of the Constitution’s language is at issue, the Court will 
employ a “progressive”, “dynamic” or “living tree” approach to 
interpretation.   
2. Dynamic Interpretation and Section 7 of the Charter 
The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly used discussions of 
section 7 as occasions for justifying the dynamic approach to 
constitutional construction. This has led to some remarkably “dynamic” 
interpretations of section 7 — interpretations which do not merely stray 
from the meaning intended by section 7’s original authors, but which 
completely override the framers’ intentions. The most famous (or 
perhaps “infamous”) example is the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada in B.C. Motor Vehicle.37 
In B.C. Motor Vehicle, the Court was called upon to interpret the 
meaning of “fundamental justice” in section 7. More specifically, the 
Court was required to determine whether the principles of fundamental 
justice were restricted to procedural matters (such as the right to a fair 
hearing) or whether those principles extended to embrace substantive 
matters, permitting the courts to invalidate laws on the ground that the 
substance of the law was unacceptable. From an originalist perspective, 
the meaning of “fundamental justice” in section 7 was clear: the framers 
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of section 7 had intended the phrase to have procedural content only. 
According to Assistant Deputy Minister Strayer, one of the legal 
officials responsible for drafting section 7: 
... it was our belief that the words “fundamental justice” would cover 
the same thing as what is called procedural due process, that is the 
meaning of due process in relation to requiring fair procedure. 
However, it in our view does not cover the concept of what is called 
substantive due process, which would impose substantive 
requirements as to policy of the law in question.  
 This has been most clearly demonstrated in the United States in 
the area of property, but also in other areas such as the right to life. 
The term due process has been given the broader concept of meaning 
both the procedure and substance. Natural justice or fundamental 
justice in our view does not go beyond the procedural requirements of 
fairness ... the term “fundamental justice” appears to us to be 
essentially the same thing as natural justice.38 
Several framers of section 7 echoed Strayer’s belief that 
“fundamental justice” encompassed procedural justice only. Indeed, 
Jean Chrétien, then Canada’s Justice Minister, suggested that “natural 
justice” (which has a settled procedural meaning) and “fundamental 
justice” were essentially interchangeable. 
It is not surprising that the framers of section 7 felt that the phrase 
“fundamental justice” referred only to procedural due process. The 
federal government had already used the phrase “fundamental justice” in 
section 2(e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,39 and in that context it had 
been given a purely procedural meaning. As Carter notes: 
… fundamental justice in the Bill of Rights is little more than another 
name for “natural justice”. Natural justice is a well-established concept 
that is concerned with the standards of fair procedure, rather than the 
substantive fairness of the objective or outcome of the process.40 
Indeed, the purely “procedural” meaning which the phrase 
“fundamental justice” had been given in the context of the Canadian 
Bill of Rights was one of the principal reasons for the reuse of that 
phrase in section 7 of the Charter. According to Carter: 
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… the principles of fundamental justice replaced a reference to “due 
process” in the draft of what is now section 7 of the Charter, 
specifically so as to placate concerns that our courts would engage in 
substantive review of government activity as had occurred in the 
United States.41  
The framers of section 7, knowing that the phrase “fundamental 
justice” had been interpreted (in the context of the Canadian Bill of 
Rights) to have procedural content only, simply transplanted the phrase 
into section 7. Quite sensibly, they expected the phrase “fundamental 
justice” to mean the same thing in the context of section 7 that courts 
had said it meant when it was used within the Bill of Rights. As a result, 
it is clear that the authors of section 7 intended “the principles of 
fundamental justice” to have procedural content only, and not to allow 
the substantive review of the policies underlying legislation. 
Despite overwhelming evidence that the drafters of the Charter 
intended “fundamental justice” to have procedural content only, the 
Court in B.C. Motor Vehicle gave the phrase a broad, substantive 
meaning. Speaking for a majority of the Court, Lamer J. (as he then 
was) acknowledged the historical evidence noted above but claimed that 
this historical understanding of the language used in the Charter was 
inappropriate. In adopting a decidedly dynamic interpretation of section 
7, Lamer J. claimed that the framers’ understanding of constitutional 
text was neither binding upon the court nor particularly convincing. 
According to Lamer J. for the majority, the language of section 7 
required a forward-looking, progressive interpretation regardless of 
what the constitutional drafters had intended. In his view: 
If the newly planted “living tree” which is the Charter is to have the 
possibility of growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to 
ensure that historical materials, such as the Minutes of Proceedings 
and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not stunt its growth.42 
By acknowledging the potential for “growth” and “adjustment” in 
the Constitution’s provisions, the Court in B.C. Motor Vehicle made it 
clear that where the Constitution’s language is being interpreted — 
particularly the broad and open-textured language found in section 7 — 
a dynamic form of construction is both permitted and required. 
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The Supreme Court’s commitment to the “dynamic approach” to 
interpreting section 7 is further demonstrated by the Court’s decision in 
R. v. Morgentaler.43 In that case, the Court was asked to determine 
whether the Criminal Code provisions regulating abortion services 
contravened section 7 of the Charter. Specifically, the Court was asked 
to determine whether Criminal Code restrictions on abortion violated 
women’s “security of the person” in a manner that was inconsistent with 
the principles of fundamental justice. 
An originalist construction of the Charter would surely have led to 
the conclusion that section 7 had no bearing on the Criminal Code’s 
abortion regulations. In Fidelity to Fundamental Justice: An Originalist 
Construction of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,44 Stephens undertakes an examination of the views held by 
the Charter’s authors with respect to section 7 and “the abortion 
question”. As an example, Stephens points toward the following 
statement made by Jean Chretien’s Parliamentary Secretary in the 
House of Commons:  
Because this is a matter on which there exist fundamentally different 
views in Canada, the Charter does not seek to take a position on … 
abortion, believing this is a question better left for the determination 
by Parliament in the exercise of its ordinary legislative jurisdiction 
which can be adjusted from time to time as social and moral values 
evolve. … With respect to the abortion issue, the Charter will not in 
any way alter the right of Parliament to legislate concerning abortions 
… The will of the people of Canada, as expressed through Parliament, 
shall continue to be the arbiter of the abortion issue.45 
Jean Chretien himself — then Canada’s Justice Minister — echoed 
these sentiments by making the following statement: 
I have stated the position of the government in this matter, that the 
question of abortion is dealt with in the Criminal Code and in no way 
can the Charter be used to interfere with the actions of this Parliament 
in relation to the Criminal Code and abortion.46 
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This is not to suggest that these views were held by everyone 
involved in drafting the Charter. Indeed, several members of the 
Progressive Conservative Party (as it then was) feared that, despite the 
foregoing assurances (as well as similar assurances provided by the 
Justice Department), section 7 of the Charter was sufficiently open-ended 
that it might enable a court to interfere with federal laws regarding 
abortion. As a result, the PC party proposed an amendment to the Charter, 
one explicitly stating that “Nothing in this Charter affects the authority of 
Parliament to legislate in respect of abortion.”47 This amendment was 
defeated 129-61. The principal reason for its defeat, Stephens argues, was 
that a majority of Parliamentarians (including Prime Minister Trudeau 
and members of both the NDP and the Liberal Party) took the view that 
the amendment was “redundant” — that the amendment added nothing of 
substance to the Charter, as section 7 had no bearing on the government’s 
authority to regulate abortion as it saw fit.48  
Despite fairly convincing evidence that the framers of section 7 
believed that the section had no impact on the Criminal Code’s 
provisions regarding abortion, the Court in Morgentaler held that the 
relevant Code provisions violated section 7. The Court further held that 
the Code’s abortion regulations could not be saved by section 1. As a 
result, the Code’s abortion regulations were struck down as unjustifiable 
violations of section 7. This implies, of course, that the authors of 
section 7 had been wrong about its meaning — they had failed to 
understand the text they authored. Where the authors of section 7 had 
been committed to the notion that the provision had no impact on 
abortion regulations, Dickson C.J. claimed that it was “beyond any 
doubt” that the Code’s abortion provisions undermined security of the 
person,49 and that this interference with protected rights could not be 
said to conform to the principles of fundamental justice. As a result, the 
Court determined that section 7 of the Charter rendered the Code’s 
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abortion provisions unconstitutional, notwithstanding the fact that 
section 7 had been agreed to, in part, as a result of repeated assurances 
that Parliament’s laws regarding abortion would not be affected by the 
provision. In effect, the Court interpreted section 7 dynamically: they 
adopted an interpretation of section 7 which responded to (the Court’s 
view of) current needs, current values and a current vision of justice, 
paying little or no attention to the intention of the framers. 
Recent Charter jurisprudence has confirmed the Court’s 
commitment to the dynamic interpretation of section 7. Consider the 
decision of the Supreme Court in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney 
General).50 In that case, the Court was asked to determine whether or 
not certain aspects of Quebec’s welfare scheme violated section 7 of the 
Charter. In particular, the question was whether or not the welfare 
scheme’s alleged failure to provide adequate social assistance to young 
people constituted a deprivation of “life, liberty and security of the 
person” within the meaning of that phrase in section 7. 
From an interpretive perspective, the most interesting aspect of the 
Gosselin decision has little to do with the case’s outcome, or with the 
Court’s views regarding the impact of section 7 of the Charter on 
Quebec’s welfare system. Instead, the importance of Gosselin lies in the 
Court’s demonstration of the depths of its commitment to dynamic 
interpretation. Indeed, certain statements by the majority in Gosselin 
show that the Court’s commitment to dynamic construction, and to its 
vision of section 7 as a “fluid” or “evolutive” provision, is so deep that 
even decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada cannot halt the 
evolution of section 7. 
Writing for the majority in Gosselin, McLachlin C.J. said very little 
regarding the framers’ intention with respect to the meaning of section 
7’s language. Instead, she focused on the meaning section 7 had been 
given in prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. Specifically, 
the Chief Justice noted that the lion’s share of past Supreme Court 
readings of section 7 had suggested that the section applied only to state 
actions taken in an adjudicative context — a context that was notably 
absent on the facts of Gosselin. Because the Gosselin case related to the 
administration of a welfare system, and not to an individual’s treatment 
during adjudicative proceedings, earlier cases regarding the meaning of 
section 7 made it appear that section 7 had no bearing on Gosselin’s 
                                                                                                            
50 [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Right Theory, Wrong Reasons 191 
complaint. Somewhat surprisingly, the Chief Justice (for the majority) 
went on to hold that these earlier readings of section 7 were no bar to 
the application of section 7 beyond the adjudicative realm. Indeed, 
McLachlin C.J. made it clear that, pursuant to the Court’s dynamic 
approach to interpreting section 7, past judicial interpretations of the 
section can be modified, ignored or even explicitly abandoned where the 
Court takes the view that a new interpretation is better. According to 
McLachlin C.J. (for the majority): 
… the dominant strand of jurisprudence on s. 7 sees its purpose as 
guarding against certain kinds of deprivation of life, liberty and 
security of the person, namely those “that occur as a result of an 
individual’s interaction with the justice system and its administration” 
... This view limits the potential scope of “life, liberty and security of 
person” by asking whom or what s. 7 protects against. Under this 
narrow interpretation, s. 7 does not protect against all measures that 
might in some way impinge on life, liberty or security, but only 
against those that can be attributed to state action implicating the 
administration of justice. … With respect, I believe this conclusion 
may be premature ... An adjudicative context might be sufficient, but 
we have not yet determined that one is necessary in order for s. 7 to be 
implicated.  
 In my view, it is both unnecessary and undesirable to attempt to 
state an exhaustive definition of the administration of justice at this 
stage, delimiting all circumstances in which the administration of 
justice might conceivably be implicated. The meaning of the 
administration of justice, and more broadly the meaning of s. 7, should 
be allowed to develop incrementally, as heretofore unforeseen issues 
arise for consideration.51 
Note the italicized language in this passage. The meaning of section 
7 is a matter of judicial determination — not a question of intention or 
authorial expectations. In the future, section 7 might apply beyond the 
adjudicative context, because “we” (the judges) “have not yet 
determined that [an adjudicative context] is necessary”. This passage 
makes two points. First, it reminds us that the framers’ intention has 
little bearing on section 7’s meaning. Second, it points out that the 
Court’s earlier interpretations of section 7 — interpretations which 
suggested that the section applied only where adjudicative proceedings 
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threatened to result in the deprivation of a person’s life, liberty or 
security of the person — did not preclude a holding that section 7 had 
recently evolved such that it now applied beyond the bounds of 
adjudicative contexts. 
Continuing her review of earlier Supreme Court interpretations of 
section 7, the Chief Justice noted that earlier courts had been unwilling 
to construe section 7 in a way that imposed upon the state an affirmative 
duty to safeguard life, liberty or security of the person. Instead, the 
Court’s earlier jurisprudence had suggested that section 7 imposed no 
“positive obligations” of any kind: the section merely prohibited certain 
state deprivations of life, liberty and security of the person, imposing no 
affirmative duty to promote those rights. According to the majority in 
Gosselin, these earlier Supreme Court interpretations of section 7 could 
not preclude a future court from holding that section 7 had continued to 
evolve, resulting in a “new meaning” that contradicted earlier holdings 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. According to the Chief Justice: 
Nothing in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that s. 7 places a 
positive obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, 
liberty or security of the person. Rather, s. 7 has been interpreted as 
restricting the state’s ability to deprive people of these. Such a 
deprivation does not exist in the case at bar.  
 One day s. 7 may be interpreted to include positive obligations. 
To evoke Lord Sankey’s celebrated phrase in Edwards v. Attorney-
General for Canada … the Canadian Charter must be viewed as a 
“living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits” 
… It would be a mistake to regard s. 7 as frozen, or its content as 
having been exhaustively defined in previous cases.52 
The impact of these statements should be clear. In the context of 
section 7 of the Charter, the Court’s commitment to dynamic 
construction is so deep that neither authorial intention nor prior judicial 
interpretations of the section serve as reliable indicators of the section’s 
current meaning. So long as the Court is willing to hold that the current 
needs of Canadians are now different than they were when previous 
cases were decided, or when the framers first adopted section 7, the 
Court is free to hold that section 7’s meaning has changed, perhaps 
embracing concepts that were rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in the past. The Court’s commitment to dynamic interpretation is so 
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great that neither precedent, authorial intention nor basic notions of 
certainty and predictability serve to bar the evolution of the meaning of 
section 7. 
The foregoing cases demonstrate that our highest Court views 
dynamic interpretation as the appropriate method of resolving any 
interpretive problem arising in the context of section 7 of the Charter. 
Indeed, section 7 jurisprudence has confirmed that dynamic 
interpretation is the court’s “official” method of interpreting all 
provisions of the Canadian Constitution. The traditional justifications 
offered for the court’s adoption of dynamic interpretation in the 
constitutional context are discussed in the following section of this 
essay. 
IV. JUDICIAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION 
1. The Amendment Rationale 
Why has our Supreme Court so wholeheartedly embraced dynamic 
construction in the context of the interpretation of Canada’s 
Constitution? Peter Hogg correctly notes that the language of 
constitutional documents is particularly well-suited for dynamic (or 
“progressive”) interpretation. As Hogg points out: 
The idea underlying the doctrine of progressive interpretation is that 
the Constitution Act, 1867, although undeniably a statute, is not a 
statute like any other: it is a “constituent” or “organic” statute, which 
has to provide the basis for the entire government of a nation over a 
long period of time. An inflexible interpretation, rooted in the past, 
would only serve to withhold necessary powers from the Parliament or 
Legislatures. It must be remembered too that the Constitution Act, 
1867, like other federal constitutions, differs from an ordinary statute 
in that it cannot easily be amended when it becomes out of date, so 
that its adaptation to changing conditions must fall to a large extent 
upon the courts.53 
Clearly, the need for “dynamic” or “progressive” interpretation is 
particularly pressing when constitutional language is being considered. 
As Professor Hogg points out, constitutional language must apply over 
an unusually long period, due in part to the difficulty involved in 
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amending the Constitution’s text. As social values change over time, a 
“static” constitution might no longer meet the needs of the society that it 
governs. Cumbersome amendment procedures might preclude the 
formal updating of the constitutional text to meet the current needs of 
society. As a result, the courts carry out the difficult work of “adapting” 
the constitution through dynamic interpretation, ensuring that the text 
remains relevant as society evolves.  
While it is intuitively appealing to link the adoption of dynamic 
interpretation to the difficulty involved in amending constitutional text, 
this linkage (which I refer to as the “Amendment Rationale”) does not 
fully explain our courts’ interpretive practice. Let us suppose, for a 
moment, that the cumbersome nature of the Constitution’s formal 
amending procedure is the principal justification for dynamic 
interpretation. If that is the case, then we should encounter “dynamic 
readings” of the Constitution only where two conditions are met, 
namely (1) the needs of Canadians have evolved in ways that could not 
have been anticipated by the Constitution’s framers, and (2) in the 
absence of dynamic interpretation, a formal amendment to the 
Constitution would be needed to cope with these unforeseen 
developments. It seems to me that this degree of evolution would take 
time: we should expect to see “dynamic readings” of constitutional 
language only where a significant period of time had passed between the 
adoption of the Constitution and its application to a particular set of 
facts. More importantly, if the “Amendment Rationale” is correct, we 
should see dynamic construction only where we can credibly assert that 
the framers of the Constitution could not have foreseen the issue that has 
given rise to the need for constitutional interpretation. 
Consider the dynamic readings of section 7 discussed in the 
previous section of this paper. The decision of the Court in BC Motor 
Vehicle, which overrode the framers’ intended meaning of the phrase 
“fundamental justice”, was handed down only three years after the 
adoption of the Charter. Had Canadian society evolved so much in the 
period between the adoption of the Charter and the Court’s decision in 
BC Motor Vehicle that the former needed only “procedural due process” 
while the latter required the court to engage in substantive review of 
legislative policies? I doubt it. More importantly, the notion of 
“substantive due process”, which was grafted onto the Charter by the 
Court in BC Motor Vehicle, was not a newly evolved concept that the 
framers had failed to anticipate: they had discussed it and specifically 
rejected it. As a result, the dynamic reading in BC Motor Vehicle did not 
flow from an unanticipated development that, in the absence of dynamic 
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interpretation, would have necessitated a formal constitutional 
amendment. The decision in Morgentaler is similarly difficult to justify 
by reference to the Amendment Rationale: that decision was handed 
down only six years after the Charter was adopted. Had Canadian 
society evolved so much in the intervening period that, failing a formal 
amendment of the Constitution’s text, a “judicial amendment” of section 
7 was necessary to permit the Charter to keep pace with newly evolved 
social values — values that had not been anticipated when the Charter 
was adopted? Had public debates regarding abortion markedly changed 
focus between 1982 and 1988, such that the framers’ expectations 
regarding the Charter and its application to abortion laws no longer met 
the needs of our evolving society? The answer to these questions must 
be “no”. Indeed six years after Morgentaler was decided, L’Heureux-
Dubé J. noted that the Charter was still “in its infancy”, and that 
Canada’s “socio-economic context” had not had time to evolve since the 
time of the Charter’s adoption.54 For L’Heureux-Dubé J. (who was 
dissenting on this point), this implied that dynamic interpretation was an 
inappropriate method of interpreting the Charter. Whether or not one 
agrees with L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s conclusion, one must accept that, 
because so little time had passed between the adoption of the Charter 
and the decisions in Morgentaler and BC Motor Vehicle, the dynamic 
readings of section 7 in those cases could not truly have been justified 
on the ground that the Constitution’s formal amendment procedures had 
prevented the Charter’s text from keeping pace with the needs of a 
radically changed society. As a result, the Court’s willingness to 
construe the Charter dynamically must be rooted in something other 
than the “Amendment Rationale”. 
There is a second, more compelling reason for rejecting the 
“Amendment Rationale” as the true reason behind the Court’s adoption of 
dynamic construction. Simply put, the Amendment Rationale does not 
accurately explain the courts’ interpretive practice. This can be seen when 
one examines the courts’ method of interpreting “ordinary” (that is, non-
constitutional) statutes guaranteeing human rights — legislation containing 
language which, in many important respects, parallels the language found 
in section 7. In countless cases involving the application of human rights 
enactments, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that such statutes must 
be construed through the invocation of dynamic interpretation: the 
decisions of the Court in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. 
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Simpsons-Sears Ltd.55 and British Columbia (Public Service Employee 
Relations Commission) v. British Columbia Government and Service 
Employees Union56 serve as useful illustrations. While the details of these 
cases are beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that in each case 
the Court applied dynamic construction to a Human Rights enactment 
notwithstanding the fact that Human Rights enactments can be amended 
through ordinary legislative amending procedures.57  
Why did the Courts in Sears and BCGSEU feel free to invoke 
dynamic construction as the appropriate method of interpreting human 
rights enactments? As we have seen, dynamic construction is typically 
associated with the interpretation of constitutional text, and the 
justification typically offered is that constitutions are difficult to amend. 
Human rights statutes, by contrast, can be amended just as easily as the 
Highway Traffic Act. As a result, the “Amendment Rationale” cannot 
explain the Court’s preference for dynamic interpretation. The 
willingness of the Court to use dynamic interpretation must relate to 
something other than the “Amendment Rationale”. The alternative 
justification that has been offered by our courts is discussed in the 
following section of this paper. 
2. The “Fundamental Law” Rationale 
Canadian courts seem to have noticed that the “Amendment Rationale” 
does a rather dismal job of explaining the cases in which the courts have 
invoked dynamic interpretation. Because the Amendment Rationale fails 
to correspond to our courts’ interpretive practices, Canadian jurists have 
had to articulate a new and different justification for the adoption of 
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dynamic interpretation. This alternative justification is that 
constitutional text, as well as the text of human rights legislation, 
qualifies as “fundamental legislation”. As “fundamental legislation”, 
both the Constitution and human rights enactments call for the 
application of a special form of judicial interpretation. Specifically, such 
fundamental laws must be interpreted through the invocation of 
dynamic construction.  
Why has the judiciary apparently selected dynamic construction as 
the appropriate mode of interpreting “fundamental” legislation? No 
clear reasons have been offered. Instead, when attempting to justify the 
invocation of dynamic construction in the context of constitutional text 
or human rights enactments, the courts have simply asserted that the 
importance of those documents justifies a departure from the courts’ 
typical (originalist) approach to interpretation. As Lamer J. explained in 
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink:58  
When the subject matter of a law is said to be the comprehensive 
statement of the “human rights” of the people living in that 
jurisdiction, then there is no doubt in my mind that the people of that 
jurisdiction have through their legislature clearly indicated that they 
consider that law, and the values it endeavours to buttress and protect, 
are … more important than all others … Indeed [such a law] is not to 
be treated as another ordinary law of general application. It should be 
recognized for what it is, a fundamental law.59 
In the context of interpreting section 7 of the Charter, the Court in 
Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)60 made 
similar statements to justify the use of dynamic construction. According 
to LeBel J. in Blencoe: 
 We must remember … that s. 7 expresses some of the basic values 
of the Charter … its importance is such for the definition of 
substantive and procedural guarantees in Canadian law that it would 
be dangerous to freeze the development of this part of the law. The full 
impact of s. 7 will remain difficult to foresee and assess for a long 
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while yet. Our Court should be alive to the need to safeguard a degree 
of flexibility in the interpretation and evolution of s. 7 of the Charter.61 
Once again, the “importance” (or fundamental nature) of the law 
being interpreted was the primary justification for the court’s decision to 
use dynamic construction. Once again, the linkage between 
“fundamental laws” and dynamic interpretation was not explained: it 
was simply taken for granted that a fundamental law must be subjected 
to dynamic interpretation.  
Despite the fact that the linkage between “fundamental laws” and 
dynamic interpretation has never been satisfactorily explained, it has 
become an accepted element of interpretive jurisprudence. As a result, 
where “fundamental” laws are being interpreted, the court invokes 
dynamic interpretation. Where “ordinary” laws are being interpreted, by 
contrast, the court purports to rely on originalist construction, also 
known as the “official theory” of statutory construction.62 The reason for 
this bifurcated approach to interpretation remains, generally speaking, a 
mystery. 
With respect, the courts have been wise to invoke dynamic 
interpretation in many cases. Unfortunately, the rationale given for the 
selection of dynamic interpretation in such cases is unsatisfactory: the 
fact that constitutions and human rights enactments count as 
“fundamental laws” or “more important” than other statutes provides no 
basis for interpreting such laws through the invocation of dynamic 
interpretation. Specific critiques of the “fundamental law” rationale are 
developed in the following section of this essay. 
3. Problems with the Fundamental Law Rationale 
I have never been an enthusiastic admirer of the linkage between 
“fundamental laws” and the invocation of dynamic construction. To 
begin with, the view that dynamic interpretation is required wherever 
“fundamental laws” are being construed suggests that certain laws are 
too important to be maintained and updated through an ordinary 
democratic process. Where courts declare that a particular statute counts 
as “fundamental”, the courts claim a primary role in the creation of its 
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meaning. In other words, where a particular law is deemed to be 
particularly important, the judiciary claims the authority to control the 
Act’s development — they may engage in acts of judicial amendment, 
causing the meaning of the enactment to evolve without regard for the 
intention of the author, or in ways that override the legislator’s 
expectations. Where laws are more mundane, less important, or less-
than-fundamental, by contrast, the courts are content to leave the 
statute’s meaning in the hands of the statute’s author. This approach 
seems rather crass: while the legislature is competent to control the 
meaning and growth of “ordinary” legislation, the truly important laws 
require the supervision of judges. Indeed, Supreme Court judges have 
suggested that it would be “dangerous” or “a mistake” to leave the 
meaning of fundamental laws in the hands of those who wrote and 
passed them.63 For reasons I hope are obvious, I am uncomfortable with 
the suggestion that some laws are too important to be left in the hands of 
those who proposed, developed and passed the laws in the first place. 
Leaving aside the political implications of the courts’ suggestion 
that certain laws are so important that the government cannot govern the 
laws’ meaning, it is important to consider the practical impact of the 
“fundamental law” justification for the invocation of dynamic 
construction. If the courts’ choice of interpretive theory is governed by 
the question of whether or not a particular law is “fundamental”, how 
can we tell what qualifies as a “fundamental law”? Are constitutional 
provisions and human rights enactments the only fundamental laws in 
the statute books? Clearly, Canada’s constitutional documents are 
“fundamental” in nature: they are, after all, the laws that grant our 
lawgivers the authority to enact other forms of legislation. But why are 
human rights laws “fundamental”? Are they the only non-constitutional 
laws that count as “fundamental”? While human rights enactments are 
undeniably important, are they any more “fundamental” than the 
Criminal Code’s prohibition of murder? Are they more fundamental in 
nature than laws prohibiting child abuse? Laws establishing federal 
courts? Laws allowing individuals to safeguard their own property? 
Surely, many of Canada’s laws reflect the fundamental values upon 
which Canadian society has been built. Is there something especially 
“fundamental” about human rights enactments, making statutes of this 
nature more important than all others? When Lamer J. (as he then was) 
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made the original pronouncement that human rights enactments were 
more important than other statutes, he relied upon no logical 
justification for this suggestion apart from the fact that there was “no 
doubt in [his] mind”.64 Unfortunately, Lamer J. gave no reasons for his 
confidence in the unequalled importance of human rights enactments. 
As a result, the “fundamental law” rationale provides no guidance as to 
what (apart from human rights enactments and constitutions) might 
count as fundamental laws, or why such statutes are considered 
fundamental. If the question of whether or not a particular law is 
“fundamental” governs the way in which the courts interpret the 
relevant legislation, it would be useful to have some general notion of 
what it takes to qualify as a “fundamental” statute. Indeed, some general 
description of what makes a law count as “fundamental” could allow 
Parliament to know, in advance, which of its statutes would be reshaped 
through dynamic interpretation.  
Given that, in the context of the interpretation of human rights 
enactments, the “fundamental law” rationale is often accompanied by 
references to the “quasi-constitutional” stature of such documents, one 
might argue that the fundamental nature of such statutes flows from 
parallels that exist between human rights enactments and the 
constitution. The most obvious of these parallels relates to the notion of 
paramountcy: as Lamer J. observed in Insurance Corp. of British 
Columbia v. Heerspink,65 much like Canada’s Constitution, human 
rights enactments are intended to “supersede all other laws when 
conflict arises”.66 As a result, a “fundamental” enactment might be one 
which has the ability to overrule other statutes in the event of 
disagreement between two legislative provisions. 
While it would be convenient to rely on the notion of paramountcy 
as an explanation for the courts’ suggestion that human rights 
enactments are “quasi-constitutional” or “fundamental” in nature, this 
suggestion is countered by the jurisprudence. In Robert c. Québec 
(Conseil de la magistrature),67 for example, the Quebec Court of Appeal 
referred to the Access Act of Quebec68 as “quasi-constitutional” 
legislation. The Court’s assessment of the Access Act was not based on 
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any suggestion that the Act could triumph over other statutes in the 
event of inconsistency: indeed, there is no basis for contending that  
the Access Act should ever triumph over other statutes. On the contrary, 
the Court’s suggestion that the Access Act was “quasi-constitutional” 
was rooted entirely in the notion that access to information (which is 
regulated by the Access Act) is “one of the cornerstones of our 
democratic system”.69 Like Lamer J.’s assessment of the importance of 
Canada’s human rights enactments, this amounts to nothing more than a 
value judgment regarding the relative importance of the subject matter 
of the relevant statute. The Supreme Court of Canada has made similar 
value judgments concerning other legislation.70 As a result of these 
cases, it appears that the decision of whether or not a particular law is 
“fundamental” (and accordingly deserving of dynamic interpretation) 
involves nothing more than the highly subjective determination of a 
law’s importance relative to other legislation. The decision to declare a 
law to be “fundamental”, “quasi-constitutional” or “more important” 
than other statutes is a matter of unbridled judicial discretion, providing 
no useful guidance as to why laws of this nature call for the invocation 
of dynamic construction.  
Perhaps the most important criticism of the “fundamental law” 
rationale for the use of dynamic interpretation is that this rationale does 
not explain the actual interpretive practices of the courts. In many cases 
involving laws which are neither “quasi-constitutional” nor apparently 
“more important” than other statutes, the Supreme Court of Canada has 
(without admitting it openly) invoked dynamic construction without 
reliance on the rationale proffered in cases involving constitutions and 
human rights enactments. Such cases demonstrate that the Court’s 
invocation of dynamic interpretation is not, in fact, inextricably 
intertwined with the “fundamental” or “quasi-constitutional” status of a 
particular Act. The Court’s decision in R. v. Butler71 provides a useful 
example. 
In Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada applied dynamic 
interpretation to a statute that was neither part of the Constitution nor 
“quasi-constitutional” in nature. The provision at issue in Butler was 
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section 163 of the Criminal Code — a provision that prohibited the sale 
of obscene materials. The charges against Mr. Butler stemmed from 
Butler’s sale of explicit, “hard core” videos from an adult video store 
located in Winnipeg, Manitoba. At the time that the charges were laid 
against Mr. Butler, section 163 of the Code provided as follows: 
 163(1) Everyone commits an offence who, 
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or has in his 
possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or 
circulation any obscene written matter, picture, model, 
phonograph record or other thing whatever … 
The following partial definition of “obscene” was provided by 
subsection 163(8): 
 (8) For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant 
characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and 
any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, 
cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene. 
No further definition of “obscene” was provided by the Code. 
The principal issue before the Court in Butler involved the 
constitutionality of section 163. For present purposes, however, the most 
important aspect of the Court’s decision was the manner in which the 
Court defined “obscene” for the purpose of section 163. Based on a 
strictly originalist construction, one would expect the term “obscene” to 
be given the meaning it would have held when the predecessor of 
section 163 was first enacted in 1892, or perhaps when the statute was 
substantially redrafted in 1959. In accordance with the tenets of 
originalism, the meaning of “obscene” should have been determined in 
accordance with the intention of the provision’s historical drafters: 
drafters who surely expected the section to uphold a standard of 
morality that would be considered “prudish” by current Canadian 
standards. Had the Court in fact adopted this originalist (or static) 
definition, matters that would have been embraced by section 163 at the 
time that it was drafted would still be illegal today. Such a definition 
would clearly have criminalized a broad range of behaviour that would 
otherwise be considered acceptable under current moral standards. 
The Court in Butler departed from its traditional, static method of 
interpreting ordinary legislation and adopted a dynamic interpretation of 
section 163. Writing for the majority, Sopinka J. adopted a dynamic 
definition of “obscene” that relied on current standards of morality, 
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permitting the term to evolve along with shifting public values. Rather 
than criminalizing all forms of expression that would have been viewed 
as obscene by Parliamentarians at the time of the section’s creation, 
section 163 was allowed to be “redefined” from time to time by the 
judiciary in order to keep pace with community standards. In adopting 
this dynamic “community standards” test, Sopinka J. relied on the 
following passage from the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in 
R. v. Dominion News & Gifts (1962) Ltd.:72 
Community standards must be contemporary. Times change, and ideas 
change with them. Compared to the Victorian era this is a liberal age 
in which we live. One manifestation of it is the relative freedom with 
which the whole question of sex is discussed. In books, magazines, 
movies, television, and sometimes even in parlour conversation, 
various aspects of sex are made the subject of comment, with a 
candour that in an earlier day would have been regarded as indecent 
and intolerable. We cannot and should not ignore these present-day 
attitudes when we face the question whether [the subject materials] are 
obscene according to our criminal law.73 
The Court accordingly held that the term “obscene” was essentially 
dynamic, able to change and evolve in accordance with modern 
community standards. Material that may have been viewed as obscene 
by the statute’s drafters might accordingly escape the legislation’s 
application, depending upon the way in which the material in question 
was viewed under modern notions of morality. 
As noted above, the legislation at issue in Butler was neither part of 
the Constitution nor a “quasi-constitutional” enactment, yet courts have 
consistently stated that the progressive or dynamic mode of construction 
used in Butler should be limited to these “fundamental” forms of 
legislation. The Criminal Code of Canada, while undeniably important, 
is not a “fundamental law” in the sense that it establishes basic rights, 
sows the seeds of responsible government or trumps other legislation in 
the event of inconsistencies. Indeed, Criminal Code provisions have 
been given clearly originalist constructions on many occasions. It is also 
important to note that the statute under consideration in Butler was no 
more difficult to amend than any other “normal” statute — any session 
of Parliament could have provided a new statutory definition of 
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“obscene” that kept pace with current morals or contemporary needs. 
Why, then, did the Court in Butler choose to adopt an interpretation that 
is ordinarily restricted to constitutional provisions (or at least quasi-
constitutional statutes)? In my view, the answer lies in the nature of the 
language that was being considered in Butler. Indeed, I believe that the 
Court’s decision to rely on dynamic or originalist construction is 
inevitably governed by the nature of the linguistic problem giving rise to 
the need of interpretation, and — despite judicial dicta to the contrary 
— has little or no relationship to the relative importance of the statute 
being considered. The nature of the linguistic problems governing 
courts’ interpretive choices, and the implications of these linguistic 
problems for the courts’ selection of an appropriate form of 
interpretation, are discussed in the following sections of this essay.  
V. LINGUISTIC STRUCTURES 
1. Unified Theory 
As we have seen throughout this essay, the courts’ description of their 
approach to interpretive theory has been based on a division between 
“fundamental laws”, which are interpreted by reference to dynamic 
interpretation, and “ordinary laws”, which should be interpreted by 
reference to originalist construction. As constitutions and human rights 
enactments are considered “fundamental”, they are traditionally 
interpreted in a highly dynamic fashion. 
As we saw in section IV, 3., above, there are problems with the 
“fundamental law” rationale for the invocation of dynamic 
interpretation. First, it is difficult to predict what qualifies as a 
“fundamental” or “quasi-constitutional” law. More importantly, the 
question of whether or not a particular law is “fundamental” is not an 
accurate predictor of the court’s interpretive practice: in cases such as 
Butler, the Court has shown willingness to interpret “ordinary 
enactments” in the manner that the Court has said is reserved for 
fundamental legislation. In sum, the Court’s proposed division of 
interpretive theory (that is, reserving dynamic interpretation for 
“fundamental” statutes, and using originalism for all others) is (a) based 
on an unclear (and rather flimsy) rationale that provides little or no 
practical guidance to courts faced with a choice between competing 
interpretive theories, and (b) an inaccurate description of the Court’s 
interpretive practice. This is not to say that the Court has been wrong to 
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invoke dynamic interpretation in some cases and originalism in others. 
On the contrary, it simply suggests that a new approach to “theory 
selection” is required. The Court is in need of a principled basis for 
determining whether to invoke originalism or dynamism in cases 
involving the interpretation of statutory texts. 
Elsewhere I have shown that the judiciary’s choice of interpretive 
theory should not be based on the type of document being considered 
(that is, constitutional, quasi-constitutional, fundamental or “ordinary”), 
but on the type of language giving rise to the need for interpretation.74 
Indeed, there are undeniable structures found in legislative language 
pointing the way toward the interpretive theory that best resolves 
specific interpretive problems. For present purposes, it is enough to 
focus on two specific aspects of legislative language that may guide the 
courts’ decision regarding the proper method of construing unclear 
legislation, regardless of the nature of the document being considered. 
These two linguistic structures are known as “ambiguity” and 
“vagueness”, and are discussed at length below. 
2. Ambiguity 
The need for judicial interpretation often arises because of statutory 
provisions that are ambiguous. A statute may be referred to as 
“ambiguous” where it supports two or more constructions that are 
different and specific. For example, the phrase “Universities must have 
dormitories for male and female students” is ambiguous because it has 
two specific and different meanings: on the one hand, the phrase could 
mean that universities must have co-ed accommodations (Interpretation 
“A”). On the other hand, the phrase could mean that universities must 
have some dormitories for male students only and some separate 
dormitories for female students (Interpretation “B”). The author of this 
statement meant either A or B, but the statement is ambiguous in that a 
reasonable audience could come away with either interpretation. 
Similarly, consider the following excerpt from an ambiguous reference 
letter: 
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“You will be lucky if you can get Geoff to work for you.” 
The ambiguity found in this sentence is particularly unfortunate, in 
that it leads to two potential interpretations that are diametrically 
opposed: the sentence could mean either (A) that Geoff is an excellent 
worker and that the recipient of the letter would be lucky to have Geoff 
join his or her workforce, or (B) that Geoff is lazy and the recipient of 
the letter would be well advised to refrain from offering Geoff a job. 
Obviously, the author of this sentence meant either (A) or (B), both of 
which represent specific meanings. The sentence is ambiguous, 
however, in that a reasonable reader could come away from reading this 
sentence either believing that Geoff is lazy or that Geoff would be a 
valued employee. The sentence itself gives no clues as to which of its 
two potential meanings is appropriate, and an interpreter of the letter is 
forced to search for additional information to assist in ascertaining the 
letter’s meaning. 
In order for a passage to qualify as “ambiguous”, the uncertainty of 
meaning generated by the passage must not be capable of immediate 
resolution by reference to context. For example, if the sentence “You 
will be lucky if you can get Geoff to work for you” was found in a 
glowing reference letter that spent three pages extolling Geoff’s 
wondrous abilities and admirable work ethic, any apparent ambiguity in 
the passage would disappear. In the context of an extremely positive 
reference, the apparently ambiguous sentence would clearly amount to a 
positive statement regarding Geoff’s employability. By the same token, 
if the remainder of the hypothetical reference letter clearly indicated that 
Geoff was a lazy or difficult employee, any apparent ambiguity in the 
sentence would disappear. No word, phrase or passage that is clear 
when read in context truly qualifies as “ambiguous”. 
Unfortunately, not all problems of construction can be resolved by 
appeals to context. Indeed, ambiguities of the sort referred to in the 
preceding paragraphs (i.e., turns of phrase that support two or more 
specific meanings that cannot be resolved by context) are all too 
common in Canadian legislation, and frequently give rise to the need for 
judicial interpretation. Consider the following examples: 
 Section 21(3), Canada Business Corporations Act:75 Shareholders 
and creditors of a corporation, their personal representatives, the 
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Director and, if the corporation is a distributing corporation, any 
other person, on payment of a reasonable fee and on sending to a 
corporation or its agent the affidavit referred to in subsection (7), 
may on application require the corporation or its agent to furnish 
within ten days from the receipt of the affidavit a list .... setting out 
the names of the shareholders of the corporation ...  
Who is required to pay a fee and supply an affidavit? Only the 
“other person” referred to in the section, or the Director, Shareholders 
and creditors as well?76 
 Section 10 of the Narcotic Control Act:77 A peace officer may, at 
any time without a warrant, enter and search any place other than a 
dwelling-house, and under the authority of a warrant issued under 
section 12, enter and search any dwelling-house in which the peace 
officer believes on reasonable grounds there is a narcotic by means 
of or in respect of which an offence under this Act has been 
committed. 
Does the italicized language (importing the requirement of 
reasonable grounds) apply only to searches of “dwelling-houses”, or 
must the peace officer have reasonable grounds to search “any place 
other than a dwelling-house” as well? In R. v. Jaagusta,78 the Provincial 
Court of British Columbia held that, although the literal language of the 
section makes it appear that the “reasonable grounds” requirement only 
applies to dwelling-houses, a comma should be read into the provision 
immediately preceding the italicized language, causing the requirement 
of reasonable grounds to be shared by all places that may be the subject 
of a search. 
 Section 100 (1.1) of the Criminal Code:79 The Court is not required 
to make an order [preventing a criminal from owning firearms or 
ammunition] where the Court is satisfied that the offender has 
                                                                                                            
76 An informal poll of practising lawyers demonstrated significant division on this issue, 
especially when it was pointed out that other sections of the CBCA make it clear that only persons 
other than shareholders, creditors, and the director are required to pay a “reasonable fee” in order to 
receive copies of certain documents. 
77 R.S.C. 1985, c. N-1, s. 10 (emphasis added). Note that the Narcotic Control Act has now 
been repealed and replaced by the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19. 
78 [1974] B.C.J. No. 785, [1974] 3 W.W.R. 766 (Prov. Ct.). 
79 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 100 (1.1), as amended (emphasis added). Note that this 
provision has been significantly redrafted, due (in part) to the presence of this ambiguity. See the 
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established that ... it is not desirable in the interests of the safety of 
the offender or of any other person that the order be made. 
Must the offender establish that he or she requires a firearm for his 
or her own protection or for the protection of others, or must the 
offender merely establish that he or she will not be a danger to himself, 
herself or others if permitted to carry a gun? See R. v. Austin80 for a full 
discussion of the ambiguities in this provision. 
Even section 7 of the Charter contains at least two easily identifiable 
instances of ambiguity. Section 7 of the Charter provides as follows: 
 7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice. 
Does the phrase “of the person” modify the word “security” only, or 
does it modify the words “life” and “liberty” as well? While the 
ambiguity is not obvious, it becomes evident when the phrase “life, 
liberty and security of the person” is compared to the phrase “men, 
women and children weighing over one hundred pounds”.81 Similarly, it 
is unclear whether the text of section 7 refers to two distinct sets of 
rights (namely, the right to life, liberty and security of the person as well 
as an independent right not to be “deprived thereof”), or whether the 
“not to be deprived” clause merely explains the nature of the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person. 
Each of the foregoing provisions is ambiguous in the sense that the 
provision may give rise to two or more competing meanings, only one 
of which accords with the intent of the statute’s drafter. A reasonable 
reader of the provisions may come away with an incorrect impression, 
simply because of imprecise language or faulty syntax that has been 
used in the drafting of the enactment being considered. Wherever a 
statute’s language gives rise to this form of equivocation or uncertainty, 
the language of the statute may be referred to as “ambiguous”.  
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3. Vagueness 
“Vagueness” must be distinguished from ambiguity. According to Reed 
Dickerson, vagueness and ambiguity are completely separate concepts 
that have been blurred by careless lawyers and academics. In 
Dickerson’s opinion: 
It is unfortunate that many lawyers persist in using the word 
“ambiguity” to include vagueness. To subsume both concepts under 
the same name tends to imply that there is no difference between them 
or that their differences are legally unimportant. Ambiguity is a 
disease of language, whereas vagueness, which is sometimes a disease, 
is often a positive benefit. With at least this significant difference 
between the two concepts, it is helpful to refer to them by different 
names.82 
A statement may be referred to as “vague” where the breadth of the 
language used in the statement gives rise to a range of meanings that 
may or may not be consistent. For example, consider the phrase 
“freedom of expression”. What exactly does this mean? Unlike the 
ambiguous statements set out in the previous section, the phrase 
“freedom of expression” does not lend itself to a finite number of clear 
and specific constructions, but instead suggests a continuum of 
meanings. It may include the freedom to do all things that convey 
information, including peaceful or violent protest, harassing telephone 
calls, macaroni art and interpretive dance (Interpretation A). On the 
other hand, it may include only “valuable expression” that is 
demonstrably worthy of constitutional protection, i.e., those forms of 
expression that promote traditional democratic values (Interpretation B). 
The statement is vague (rather than ambiguous) because the interpreter 
is not confined to a choice between interpretations A and B. Instead, the 
interpreter has the freedom to choose from an almost infinite number of 
meanings that can be plotted along a continuum starting with A (an 
exceedingly broad interpretation) and ranging to narrow interpretations 
such as B (or even beyond). It is impossible to claim with any degree of 
confidence that the utterer of the statement meant either A or B. Indeed, 
the author of vague language might not have had a single, precise 
intention when making the vague statement. The author may have had 
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only a rough idea of the meaning being conveyed, or may have wanted 
the details of the statement’s meaning to be ironed out through judicial 
interpretation. 
Viewed from another perspective, a vague word or phrase is 
analogous to an empty basket into which any number of objects (in this 
case, meanings) can be placed. The basket might be full, embracing all 
of the possible meanings that are attributable to the words being 
considered, or the basket may be relatively empty, embracing only some 
small category or sub-set of the meanings that could be attributed to the 
vague word or phrase. Consider, for example, the following legislative 
passage: 
 178. Every one other than a peace officer engaged in the 
discharge of his duty who has in his possession in a public place or 
who deposits, throws or injects or causes to be deposited, thrown or 
injected in, into or near any place, (a) an offensive volatile substance 
that is likely to alarm, inconvenience, discommode or cause 
discomfort to any person or to cause damage to property ... is guilty of 
an offence punishable on summary conviction. 
This passage (which is found in section 178 of Canada’s Criminal 
Code) is replete with vague terminology. Consider the phrase “offensive 
volatile substance”. As a vague legislative phrase, “offensive volatile 
substance” can be looked upon as an empty basket capable of holding a 
broad range of meanings — the “basket of meanings” might contain 
relatively few meanings, embracing only those volatile substances that 
pose a danger to human health.83 On the other hand, the basket might be 
filled to the brim, including any chemically volatile substance with the 
potential to offend (by producing a foul odour or an unpleasantly 
coloured gas, for example). The section itself provides some interpretive 
guidance: based on the closing language of subparagraph (a), the 
substance in question must be one that is capable of causing alarm or 
inconvenience. Using the “basket of meanings” approach, we know that 
any “offensive volatile substance” that is incapable of causing 
inconvenience or alarm should be excluded from the basket. This gives 
rise to further questions of degree, such as the degree of inconvenience 
or alarm that might be caused by the substance in question. Even with 
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this interpretive guidance, we are uncertain as to whether the basket of 
meanings associated with “offensive volatile substance” embraces 
weapons-grade plutonium, pepper-spray or both. The task of the 
judiciary when faced with vague terminology is to determine the extent 
to which the basket of meanings must be filled, excluding those 
potential meanings that do not “fit” with the legislation in question. 
A quick perusal of any volume of the Revised Statutes of Canada 
will reveal that vague legislative phrases are very common. Consider the 
following examples: 
 Section 173 of the Criminal Code: Everyone who wilfully does an 
indecent act ... in any place, with intent thereby to insult or offend 
any person, is guilty of an offence punishable on summary 
conviction. 
What constitutes an indecent act? Indecency might include coarse 
language or vulgar humour, or it may be confined to acts of extreme 
indecency such as violent sex-acts performed in public. Similarly, what 
is meant by the term “offend”? Does the intention to be ill-mannered 
constitute an intent to offend, or must the “offender” do something that 
the audience considers immoral or indecent? 
 Section 23(1) of the Food and Drugs Act:84 Subject to subsection 
(1.1), an inspector may at any reasonable time enter any place where 
the inspector believes on reasonable grounds any article to which 
this Act or the regulations apply is manufactured, prepared, 
preserved, packaged or stored ... 
The term “reasonable” is used twice in this section, with no 
guidance as to what might be a “reasonable” time to conduct a search or 
a “reasonable” ground for suspecting that certain articles may be present 
in the place to be searched. 
Constitutional laws can be particularly vague. Consider the 
following passages from the Charter: 
 Section 11(d): Any person charged with an offence has the right ... 
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a 
fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal. 
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What constitutes a “fair” hearing? Clearly, this fairness must include 
something beyond an independent and impartial tribunal (which is dealt 
with separately by the section), but no further guidance is provided. 
 Section 12: Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel 
and unusual treatment or punishment. 
Clearly, some forms of punishment are permitted under this section, 
but no definition of cruelty or unusualness is provided.85 
Section 7 of the Charter is extraordinarily vague, giving rise to a 
broad range of interpretive problems. As we saw in the previous section, 
section 7 of the Charter provides as follows: 
 Section 7: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the 
person, and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance 
with the principles of fundamental justice. 
How broadly or narrowly should the courts define “liberty”? What 
visions of justice qualify as “fundamental”? Does “security of the 
person” include economic security, physical security, or something else? 
As Mark Carter notes, some of the concepts embedded in section 7’s 
language are “as enigmatic and amorphous as any in our jurisprudence”.86  
Although some of the aforementioned legislative provisions may 
contain ambiguous phrases, the problems noted above result from 
language that is vague. Rather than giving rise to two or more specific, 
contradictory, plausible meanings, the language of these provisions 
leads to broad ranges of meaning, with little or no guidance as to the 
meaning intended by each provision’s drafter. The extent to which one 
must fill the “basket of meanings” associated with each passage is 
unclear, leading to the need for judicial interpretation. 
According to Reed Dickerson, the interpretive problems caused by 
vagueness flow from the “open texture of concepts” that is inherent in 
vague language. In Dickerson’s opinion: 
Whereas “ambiguity” in its classical sense refers to equivocation, 
“vagueness” refers to the degree to which, independently of 
equivocation, language is uncertain in its respective application to a 
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number of particulars. Whereas the uncertainty of ambiguity is central, 
with an “either-or” challenge, the uncertainty of vagueness lies in 
marginal questions of degree.87 
Thus, where language leaves the interpreter with a choice between 
an easily ascertainable number of specific interpretive choices, the 
problem can be attributed to ambiguity. Where the language being 
interpreted leads to a broad continuum of meanings (giving rise to 
“marginal questions of degree”), the problem can be attributed to 
language that is vague. 
4. Implications of Vagueness 
The use of vague language in statutory provisions does not necessarily 
imply a lack of skill on the part of the statute’s drafters. Indeed, by 
employing vague language in an enactment, the legislature is sending 
signals to the courts that should help the judiciary select the appropriate 
means of resolving interpretive problems. By recognizing the existence 
and implications of these “legislative signals”, courts can come to 
understand a basic link between originalist and dynamic interpretation: 
in many cases, the use of vague language may actually imply that the 
legislature’s intent (which is the touchstone of originalist construction) 
was to permit the use of dynamic interpretation and to acknowledge the 
role of judicial “creativity” in the construction and application of 
legislation. 
One implication of vague statutory language is that the legislature 
sought to avoid making political choices. Consider the difficult 
decisions that were involved in the drafting of Canada’s Charter of 
Rights. Which kinds of behaviour were worthy of constitutional 
protection? How far could Parliament go in limiting or overriding basic 
freedoms? What kinds of remedies are available for a breach of Charter 
rights? Anyone who has watched the proceedings of Parliament can 
appreciate the Herculean task involved in getting a group of politicians 
to agree on these highly sensitive matters. How did the Charter’s 
drafters finally reach a consensus? By drafting the Constitution in 
extremely vague language and leaving politically hazardous details to 
the courts. Rather than making all of the difficult, politically charged 
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decisions, the framers agreed on basic principles and left the courts to 
fill in the blanks. For example, the framers did not have to undertake the 
difficult task of deciding whether or not particular forms of expression 
were protected under section 2(b) of the Charter. Instead, the framers 
simply protected “expression” and left the courts to make the difficult 
policy choices. Similarly, rather than going to the immeasurable trouble 
of enumerating the instances in which a Charter-based right may be 
restricted in the face of competing social policies, the framers chose to 
enact the exceedingly vague language of section 1, which subjects all 
Charter rights to “reasonable limits”. Clearly, the difficult task of 
expounding upon the limits that are “reasonable” has been left to the 
judiciary, permitting the Charter’s framers to entrench a series of 
governing principles rather than a comprehensive set of specific rules. 
This practice is not confined to the drafting of constitutions. Where the 
drafting of any statute involves difficult and sensitive political choices, 
vagueness may be employed as an expedient drafting tool to delay the 
choices by remitting them to future judicial construction. 
The use of vagueness as a means of shifting political choices to the 
judiciary does not amount to an abdication of legislative responsibility. 
On the contrary, reliance on vague language is often the only means by 
which the legislature can carry out its duty: in a representative 
government, statutes are often born of cooperation between legislative 
actors who are unable to agree on specific details. Even where a 
majority government holds the reins of state, individual members of that 
majority may passionately disagree on the contents of proposed 
legislation. Despite their inability to agree on legislative minutiae, 
legislators can often compromise through the use of general language 
that is sufficiently broad to encompass the meanings intended by several 
“disagreeable drafters” and sufficiently imprecise to avoid entrenching 
any one drafter’s specific views. This commonly used technique of 
legislative drafting has been referred to as the use of “more or less 
intentional obscurities, perplexities, or imperfections, inserted or 
permitted with a view to facilitate the passage of the Bill through 
Parliament”.88 Through the use of vague language, the passage of bills 
that might otherwise die on Parliament’s floor can be secured. 
The power to garner sufficient votes to ensure the passage of a Bill 
is not the only reason for using vague language. A second function of 
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vague language is to demonstrate Parliament’s intention to grant 
discretion to the courts and other officials charged with the task of 
administering legislation. According to Francis Bennion: 
By use of a word or phrase of wide meaning, legislative power is 
delegated to the processors whose function is to work out the detailed 
effect ... until the details are worked out, it will be doubtful what 
exactly they are.89 
Similarly, Reed Dickerson claims that “vagueness is often 
desirable” in cases where “the legislative client believes it desirable to 
leave the resolution of uncertainties to those who will administer and 
enforce the statute”.90 In other words, contrary to the assumption of 
originalists, statutory meaning does not precede interpretation in cases 
involving vague statutory language. Only a rough idea of the 
legislation’s meaning has been established, with the details left to be 
worked out by courts or administrative officials. 
Why would a legislature seek to delegate its powers to judicial or 
administrative bodies? To put it bluntly, legislators may recognize their 
own inability to predict the practical ramifications of legislation. The 
legislator, who lacks the practical experience to understand the 
appropriate application of an enactment, knows that the members of the 
judiciary (or other body charged with administering and enforcing 
legislation) often have the experience and the knowledge required to 
apply vague statutory language in a manner that is appropriate. 
Consider, for example, section 11 of the Narcotic Control Act (“NCA”) 
(now repealed),91 which permitted the police to engage in warrantless 
searches based on “reasonable grounds”. The phrase “reasonable 
grounds” was not defined in the NCA. Nowhere in the statute was the 
judiciary given guidance as to what might constitute “reasonable 
grounds” for the purposes of the Act. Similarly, section 63 of the 
Criminal Code prohibits “tumultuous disturbances” of the peace. 
“Disturbing the peace” is not defined. Nor does the Code describe how 
one could disturb the peace in a “tumultuous” manner. In instances such 
as these, the drafter has used an extremely broad term for the purpose of 
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delegating the task of filling in the “legislative blanks” to the judiciary. 
Judges are able to determine what are “reasonable grounds” for searches 
because of long exposure to fact situations involving police behaviour. 
Judges know what “disturbs the peace tumultuously” because of their 
great experience adjudicating offences against the public order. The 
legislator, by contrast, has neither the expertise nor the inclination to 
define these vague terms with specificity. Through the use of the vague 
language found in these statutes, the legislature acknowledges the 
judiciary’s expertise and grants courts the discretion to apply and 
interpret the law as they see fit.92 
Finally, the use of vague language may demonstrate the drafters’ 
intent to permit the language of an enactment to take on a life of its own. 
One unfortunate aspect of a strictly originalist approach to interpretation 
is the refusal to acknowledge that the drafters may have wanted the 
courts to use dynamic interpretation when construing certain provisions. 
According to Peter Hogg, “what originalism ignores is the possibility 
that the framers were content to leave the detailed application ... to the 
courts of the future, and were content that the process of adjudication 
would apply the text in ways unanticipated at the time of drafting”.93 In 
other words, the drafters may actually be aware of the evolutive nature 
of statutory language, and hope that the courts employ a progressive or 
dynamic approach to interpreting the language used in their enactments. 
The manner in which the legislative drafters signal their intent to leave 
the stewardship of language to the courts is through the use of vague 
language, which lends itself to evolution through a dynamic interpretive 
process. 
If the use of vague language implies a delegation of power from the 
drafters to the courts or an expression of the desire to permit language to 
evolve, what approach should interpreters take when confronted with 
vague legislative terms? In my view, the construction of vague language 
necessarily requires the use of dynamic interpretation. Where the 
legislature sees fit to express its intention in vague terms, the courts 
should be free to assume either that (1) the lawgiver wished to delegate 
the development and detailed application of the statute to the judiciary 
                                                                                                            
92 This point is underscored in cases involving statutes that are administered by 
administrative officials or tribunals. In such cases, the body charged with administering the statute 
is often staffed by experts in the relevant legislative field. 
93 Hogg, note 53, supra, at 1392. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Right Theory, Wrong Reasons 217 
(either because of judicial expertise or for reasons relating to political 
expedience), or (2) the legislature wished to allow the statute to evolve 
along with changes in society’s views or public policy. Whichever 
reason the lawgiver had for drafting a vague provision, the court is 
clearly justified in using dynamic interpretation to resolve interpretive 
problems. Indeed, adopting a strictly originalist approach in these 
situations is almost impossible. If the drafter had no specific intention 
(as is often the case where vague language is concerned), then the 
foundation of originalist construction has disappeared, leaving the court 
with no choice but to adopt a dynamic construction. As noted above, 
interpreters cannot help but be influenced by the social and factual 
context that surrounds an interpretive problem. Where the legislature, 
through the use of vague terminology, has refrained from providing the 
court with sufficient guidance to determine the statute’s meaning, the 
court should be free to rely openly on this social and factual context in 
ascribing meaning to the enactment’s language. More importantly, the 
court should be explicit in its reliance on a dynamic form of 
construction, openly admitting that its decision is based on current 
social policy rather than on presumed, specific legislative intent. This 
approach is more honest than originalist construction in that it openly 
recognizes the role of application in statutory construction: when 
interpreting vague statutory provisions, the interpreter will inevitably be 
influenced by the external factual context. More importantly, the use of 
dynamic interpretation in the construction of vague language permits the 
court to respond to current needs while still respecting the framer’s 
intention: if the lawgiver had no specific or detailed intention with 
respect to a statute’s meaning, or chose to enact vague language to avoid 
a political choice, the judiciary is clearly within its rights to “create a 
meaning” that is consistent with contemporary ideals. By accepting the 
delegation of power that is implied by vague language, the courts do not 
intrude on the legislature’s function, but rather respect the author’s 
intention to have the courts make detailed decisions that the drafters 
lacked the ability (or the inclination) to make. 
As we noted in section II, 3. above, courts typically voice reluctance 
to depart from legislative intention in all cases save those involving 
constitutional statutes or “fundamental laws” (such as human rights 
enactments). While human rights enactments and constitutional laws 
might warrant the invocation of dynamic construction, courts contend 
that ordinary enactments (such as criminal laws, taxing acts and 
immigration statutes) must be interpreted through reliance on originalist 
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construction. Section IV, 2. of this essay demonstrated that, in practice, 
courts do not truly abide by this bifurcated approach to interpretive 
theory. On the contrary, the courts appear to choose their interpretive 
theories based on unclear (or unarticulated) reasons, which may have 
little or nothing to do with the nature of the document being considered. 
Recall the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Butler94 
(discussed in section IV, 3., above). In that case, the Court was asked to 
interpret section 163 of the Criminal Code, which prohibited the 
distribution of any “obscene” material. As we saw in section IV, 3., the 
Court in Butler construed the word “obscene” in a distinctly dynamic 
fashion, eschewing reliance on traditional notions of legislative intent. 
What was it that led the Court in Butler to adopt a dynamic approach, 
rather than adhering to originalist construction? The legislation at issue 
in Butler was neither part of the constitution nor a “quasi-constitutional” 
enactment, yet (as we have seen) the courts have consistently stated that 
the progressive or dynamic mode of construction used in Butler should 
be restricted to cases involving these progressive and “evolutive” 
enactments. In my view, the use of dynamic interpretation in cases such 
as Butler is not driven by the nature of the document being interpreted, 
but by the nature of the language giving rise to interpretive problems.  
Like much of the language found in constitutional documents or in 
the provisions of human rights legislation, the term “obscene” (which 
gave rise to the interpretive problem in Butler) is not ambiguous in the 
sense that it gives rise to two or more distinct interpretive choices. On 
the contrary, the word “obscene” is extremely vague in that an almost 
infinite range of interpretive choices are available. Some might consider 
the term “obscene” to encompass only the depiction of explicit sexual 
contact. Some might extend the term to include anything that could 
make a pastor blush. Between these two extremes are countless 
variations of meaning, each of which could supply a supportable 
definition of “obscene”. Because the legislature saw fit to enact section 
163 through the use of vague terminology, the Court in Butler was free 
to make up for this lack of precision through the use of a dynamic form 
of construction.  
The language at issue in Butler parallels the language at issue in 
B.C. Motor Vehicle, Morgentaler, Gosselin, Sears and BCGSEU 
(discussed above). In those cases, the Court was asked to interpret the 
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terms “fundamental justice”, “liberty”, “security of the person”, 
“discriminate” and “discrimination”. The terms in question are not 
ambiguous in the sense that they give rise to two or more specific and 
ascertainable meanings. On the contrary, the relevant terms are vague. 
Consider, for example, the term “liberty”: perhaps it includes nothing 
beyond freedom from physical restraint. Perhaps it includes privacy 
interests, as it does in the context of the United States’ Constitution. 
Perhaps it includes freedom of contract, or the liberty to act however 
one chooses (subject only to limits prescribed in accordance with 
section 1). An interpreter of section 7 is not forced to choose between 
these various options, but may fill the “basket of meanings” associated 
with the term “liberty” as little or as much as the interpreter desires. 
Like all vague terms, the term “liberty” gives rise to marginal questions 
of degree, rather than to the “either/or” challenge that is inherent in 
ambiguous legislation. The Court’s decisions involving section 7 of the 
Charter, like the decisions in Sears, BCGSEU and Butler, make it clear 
that where interpretive problems arise from the use of language of this 
nature, the use of dynamic interpretation provides a principled means of 
creating specific statutory meanings.  
5. Implications of Ambiguity 
Unlike vagueness, which serves a number of purposes in legislative 
provisions, ambiguity (as described in section V, 2., above) can generally 
be traced to drafting errors. These drafting problems can be grouped into 
two specific categories, namely (1) clumsy syntax, or (2) the use of 
homonyms or terms with multiple meanings. Where either of these 
common language errors occurs in the creation of legislation, the result 
is an ambiguous statute that will give rise to the need for judicial 
interpretation. 
The first source of ambiguity was referred to by William Empson as 
the divergence of language “from the colloquial order of statement” in 
ways that imply “several colloquial orders from which the statement has 
diverged”.95 Although Empson’s comments were made in the context of 
poetic interpretation, they are equally applicable in the context of 
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legislation. For an example of this type of ambiguity, consider the 
following legislative provision: 
A ten per cent reduction in federal tax shall be available to all 
charitable corporations and institutions performing educational 
functions. 
The phrase “charitable corporations and institutions performing 
educational functions” departs from the “colloquial order of statement” 
by distributing multiple adjectives across a collection of nouns. 
Consider the following questions: must charitable corporations perform 
educational functions in order to qualify for the reduction in federal tax? 
Must institutions performing educational functions also be charitable in 
order to qualify for the benefit of the statute? Depending upon the 
answers that any particular reader gives to these questions, various 
specific and contradictory meanings of the statute will be generated. In 
other words, the statute is ambiguous. The ambiguity arises due to 
grammatical irregularities in the statute, or the departure of the statute’s 
language from accepted patterns of speech. This particular source of 
ambiguity is common in legislation, and generally arises due to the 
drafter’s desire to use as few words as possible when attempting to 
describe a complex subject. 
The second most common source of legislative ambiguity is the 
unfortunate use of homonyms that cannot be resolved by context. For 
example, consider the following excerpt from an actual piece of 
legislation: 
... any constable shall take into custody, without warrant, and 
forthwith convey before a justice, any person who within his view 
commits [a public order offence].96 
Consider the possible meanings of the word “view” in this 
provision. Does it mean “opinion”, in which case the officer may arrest 
any person who “within the officer’s opinion” is committing an offence, 
or does the word “view” mean “field of vision”, in which case an officer 
may arrest only persons who the officer actually sees breaking the law? 
The section provides no clues as to which of the two meanings is 
appropriate. Indeed, even context cannot resolve the ambiguity with any 
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degree of certainty: in Wills v. Bowley97 England’s highest Court was 
sharply divided over the proper meaning of “view” in this provision.98 
If ambiguity can be traced to problems of grammar or the 
thoughtless use of terms with multiple meanings, what does ambiguous 
language imply when found in legislation? Unlike vagueness, which can 
be the government’s way of creating judicial discretion or avoiding 
political choice, “ambiguity” generally implies nothing more than a 
fallible drafter. While statutes are drafted in vague terms in order to 
accomplish various legislative objectives, “beyond human fallibility, 
there is no reason why a legal instrument need be ambiguous”.99 
Ambiguity does not imply the form of “delegation of power” that is 
inherent in the use of vague provisions. Consider the following samples 
of ambiguous legislation: 
 (1) A will shall be void “if the will is duly executed without the 
[testator’s] attestation”.100 
 (2) The ownership of firearms is restricted to “the son and heir 
apparent of an esquire, or other person of higher degree”.101 
Clearly, the authors of each of these statements must have meant to 
say something specific. The author of statement (1) either meant (a) that 
the testator’s signature must accompany the witness’ signature 
(regardless of who signs first), or (b) that the testator must sign the will 
before it is executed by witnesses. Similarly, statement (2) is highly 
ambiguous in that it supports at least three meanings: it could permit the 
ownership of firearms by (a) all persons of higher degree than esquires; 
(b) all persons of higher degree than the sons and heirs apparent of 
esquires; or (c) the sons and heirs apparent of all persons of higher 
degree than esquires. The language of the statement provides little or no 
evidence of which of the three meanings should be preferred. 
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98 Note that, if the “opinion” meaning of “view” is selected, the court will now be faced 
with a problem of vagueness: must the “view” be based on reasonable grounds, mere suspicion, or 
something in between? Compound problems of this nature (i.e., interpretive problems involving 
overlapping instances of vagueness and ambiguity) are discussed in chapter 6 of R. Graham, 
Statutory Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2001). 
99 Reed Dickerson, “The Diseases of Legislative Language” (1964) 1 Harv. J. on Legis. 5, 
at 9. 
100 The Wills Act 1968 (U.K.). 
101 22 & 23 Car. II, c. 25. 
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Statements (1) and (2) are not vague: neither statement suffers from 
the use of general language that supports a broad continuum of 
meanings. Instead, each of the statements supports two or more specific 
and contradictory meanings which give rise to the need for judicial 
interpretation. In other words, the statements are ambiguous. The 
interpretive problems inherent in statements (1) and (2) arose from the 
authors’ inability to convey the intended meaning with precision. The 
implications that arise where statutes are drafted in vague terms are not 
present in these cases. There was no failure of the author to form a 
specific intention. There was no attempt to delegate power to the 
judiciary. There was no bid by the author to promote the evolution of a 
statutory provision. All that happened was an unfortunate drafting error, 
causing the statute’s failure to spell out the drafter’s intention. In such 
cases, there is no need or justification for dynamic interpretation. The 
interpreter’s only task is archaeological in nature, requiring the judge to 
sift through the statute’s language in search of clues as to the drafter’s 
intended meaning. Because of the nature of ambiguity (described in 
section V, 2., above), we can be certain that an “original intention” does 
exist. The language of an ambiguous enactment supports only a small 
number of meanings, only one of which can be the meaning that the 
legislative drafter meant to convey. Because this meaning resides within 
the enactment from the time of its creation, the job of the interpreter is 
to discover this meaning and apply it to the facts before the court. In 
other words, ambiguity must be resolved through originalist 
construction. All elements of originalist construction, including rules of 
grammatical construction, contextual interpretation, basic interpretive 
presumptions (including the mischief rule, the golden rule and countless 
maxims of construction) and evidence of historical intent are uniquely 
suited to resolving this form of linguistic conundrum. Through the 
application of these well-accepted rules of interpretation, the judiciary is 
able to ferret out the provision’s intended meaning and ensure that the 
legislator’s authority as “lawgiver” is respected. The weaknesses of 
originalist construction are of minimal importance in such cases. 
Ambiguity (by its very definition) confines the judge’s choice to a small 
number of discrete interpretive options. In cases involving ambiguity, 
the originalist has no need to carry out an endless, fruitless search for a 
malleable or hard-to-define intention: the meaning that the drafter hoped 
to convey will be found within one of a few possible constructions of 
the ambiguous passage. All that the originalist interpreter must do in 
such cases is apply the tools of originalism to select the one construction 
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(from a small number of choices) that exemplifies the statute’s “true 
meaning”. 
It should be noted that originalist construction is the appropriate 
method of resolving ambiguities, even in those rare instances where the 
relevant ambiguity is found in a “fundamental statute” such as the 
Charter. Consider, for example, section 7 of the Charter, which provides 
that everyone has the right to “life, liberty and security of the person”. 
As we saw in section V, 2., above, the phrase “of the person” can be 
read as (a) modifying only the word “security”, or (b) modifying each of 
the words “life, liberty and security”. If the phrase “of the person” 
modifies the word “liberty”, for example, no entities other than 
“persons” are entitled to the liberty rights enshrined in section 7. If the 
phrase “of the person” does not modify the word liberty, by contrast, the 
right to liberty may extend to “non-person” entities (such as partnerships 
or social clubs) as well. From a grammatical perspective, the provision 
can be read either way. This is a problem of ambiguity because it gives 
rise to an “either / or” challenge: The section either protects “liberty of 
the person” (Interpretation A), or it protects “liberty” with no limitation 
dependent upon the “personhood” (or lack thereof) of the entity being 
considered (Interpretation B). The author meant either A or B, and left 
no evidence of an intention to delegate the choice of A or B to future 
interpreters. Because of the implications of ambiguous language 
(identified above), this ambiguity should be resolved through originalist 
construction, respecting the intention of the legislative author. This is so 
despite the fact that the ambiguity is located in a “fundamental” 
enactment. Whether an ambiguity is found in an ordinary enactment, in 
a provision of the Charter, in the Criminal Code or in an Act creating 
human rights, the ambiguity should be resolved by originalist 
construction. By the same token, vague language should be interpreted 
through dynamic interpretation, regardless of the nature of the Act in 
which it is found. 
As noted above, ambiguous statutory language does not carry the 
same implications as a vague term found in legislation. In cases of 
ambiguity, the legislative drafter clearly had a specific intent: he or she 
simply committed a drafting error that failed to make this intention 
clear. Because the drafter of ambiguous language clearly had a specific 
intention, the statute contains a “true meaning” that precedes 
interpretation. Obviously, the legislature has turned its collective mind 
to a particular problem and proposed a specific solution, despite the 
drafter’s inability to express the proposed solution with precision. As 
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the elected branch of government has exercised its constitutional 
mandate and expressed its will in the form of legislation, it is the task of 
the judiciary to apply the law in accordance with the legislator’s 
expectations. Any departure from originalist construction in these cases 
runs the risk of clothing the courts with unwarranted legislative power. 
A failure to give effect to an originalist construction in such cases would 
also run afoul of Canada’s various Interpretation Acts, which command 
the courts to adopt interpretations that are based on the legislature’s 
historical objectives.102 As a result, where interpretive problems result 
from ambiguity (rather than vagueness), an originalist approach to 
interpretation should be adopted. 
6. Summary 
A court’s choice between originalism and dynamism should not be 
governed by the court’s assessment of whether or not a particular law is 
part of the Constitution, “fundamental”, “quasi-constitutional”, or “more 
than ordinary” in nature. Instead, the Court’s selection of interpretive 
theory should be based on the nature of the linguistic problem giving 
rise to the need for judicial interpretation. Where the linguistic problem 
is an instance of vagueness, the Court should use dynamic 
interpretation: through the use of vague language, the lawgiver has (a) 
demonstrated a desire to allow language to evolve, (b) sought to avoid a 
political choice, delegating this choice to the courts or to administrative 
officials, or (c) simply failed to arrive at a specific intention. Whether 
the reason for the use of vague language is reason (a), (b) or (c), there is 
no specific intention to be found: the basis of originalist construction is 
absent, and the Court is clothed with authority to invoke dynamic 
construction. In the case of ambiguous language, by contrast, the 
legislature has made a drafting error, and the only task of the court is to 
eliminate the mistake. In cases such as this, an originalist approach 
respects the separation of powers between the judiciary and the 
legislative assembly: there is a “true intention” to be found, and the job 
of the court is to correct the author’s drafting error, revealing the 
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original intention that was obscured by nothing more than an 
unintentional slip of the legislator’s pen.103  
VI. CONCLUSION  
It is unfortunate, perhaps, that Anglo-Canadian jurists first took note of 
dynamic construction when interpreting the text of constitutions. When 
interpreting an inspirational, nation-building document such as Canada’s 
Constitution, it is easy to be distracted by the importance of the 
document being construed. The interpretation of section 7 is a 
particularly awe-inspiring enterprise. As the Court noted in Blencoe, the 
text of section 7 expresses some of the basic values upon which Canada 
is built. When attempting to discern the meaning of legislation 
governing such values, it is easy to convince yourself that you are 
engaged in a special interpretive enterprise that shares very little in 
common with more “mundane” exercises of statutory construction. This 
has, perhaps, contributed to the unhappy perception that dynamic 
construction should be reserved for the interpretation of “fundamental 
statutes”. As we have seen throughout this paper, our courts have 
repeatedly (and mistakenly) claimed that only fundamental statutes 
should be construed through the invocation of dynamic interpretation, 
while merely “ordinary laws” are governed by legislative intent. As we 
have seen, this “bifurcated” approach to theory selection makes no 
sense. More importantly, it fails to correspond with the actual practices 
of our courts. 
Whether a law is considered a “fundamental law” or simply an 
“ordinary” enactment, the interpretation of the relevant law can be 
pursued by reference to a single, unified theory of statutory 
construction. Under this proposed theory, a court faced with a problem 
of construction must undertake a careful reading of the statute. The 
purpose of this reading is to reveal the nature of the linguistic problem 
plaguing the law. Where the problem is a result of vague language, the 
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Evans J. (as he then was) in Public Service Alliance of Canada v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1999] 
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court should resolve the problem through dynamic interpretation. Where 
the source of the problem is ambiguous language, by contrast, the court 
should rely on originalist construction and resolve the problem by 
reference to the legislator’s intent. The unanswerable question of 
whether or not a particular law is “fundamental” does not arise: whether 
interpreting section 7 of the Charter or a dreary set of parking 
regulations, courts should focus on the textual clues found in legislation, 
selecting whichever interpretive theory corresponds to textual clues that 
were left behind by the drafter of the relevant statute. By responding to 
the author’s textual clues, the court ensures that the interpretive theory it 
adopts, whether originalist or dynamic, respects the intentions and 
objectives of the legislative author.  
 
